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Dual Trading in the Commodity Futures
Markets: Should it be Banned?
Craig S. Donohue*
I. INTRODUCTION'
On the morning of January 19, 1989, while many of Chicago's
preeminent commodities lawyers were discussing industry issues at
the American Bar Association's Annual Futures Law Meeting on
the island of St. Martin, the Chicago Tribune disclosed that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation had been conducting a massive
two-year investigation of the world's two largest futures exchanges:
the Chicago Board of Trade (the "CBT") and the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (the "CME").2 The FBI investigation focused on
reported allegations of widespread fraud, market manipulation,
and cheating of customers in the "pits" ' 3 of the two Chicago
exchanges.4
* J.D. 1987, John Marshall. LLM. 1989, Financial Services Regulation, honors, IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. Admitted to practice in Illinois and Florida.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and in no way reflect the
views of any other individual or entity. The author assumes full responsibility for the
contents of the article.
1. This article covers developments relating to the controversy over the practice of
dual trading in the commodity futures markets that occurred prior to September 1, 1989.
New developments may have taken place after the preparation of this article but prior to
its publication.
2. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 19, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
3. At both the CBT and the CME, trading is conducted in octagonal and polygonal
pits with steps descending to the center of each pit. Generally, each pit is devoted to the
trading of one particular commodity or futures contract on that exchange. Traders stand
in groups on the steps or in the center of the pit depending on the contract month of the
commodity which they are trading. Chicago Board of Trade, Commodity Trading Man-
ual at 35 (1989).
4. The investigation was apparently launched partly in response to a complaint made
by Archer Daniels Midland Co. ("ADM"), a $6.8 billion grain and soybean producer
located in Decatur, Illinois. According to the Chicago Tribune, ADM is the world's
largest processor of farm commodities, and it has its own floor operation at the CBT.
Nevertheless, in several instances, ADM has alleged that it would place an order at a
certain price and would encounter difficulty in getting its order filled because floor bro-
kers, upon learning of the order, would give priority to their own accounts. ADM alleg-
edly participated in the investigation by giving at least two FBI agents entry-level jobs at
its commodities-trading subsidiary, ADM Investors, Inc. Farm Firms's Complaint Led
To Probe, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 2. See also Behof, Life in the Pits
Will Never be the Same, Bus. WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 32-35.
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At the center of the controversy is the thirteen-year old Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission's5 sanctioned practice known
as "dual trading."6 Dual trading allows floor brokers,7 who exe-
cute orders for customers' on behalf of futures commission
merchants9 ("FCMs"), to also trade for their own account during
the same trading period. Critics of dual trading are quick to point
out that, in their view, the inherent conflict of interest ° created by
dual trading has caused widespread abuse and has led to many of
the alleged violations currently under investigation." Two of the
more egregious forms of abuse are "front-running" 12 and "bucket-
ing."'" What the critics ignore, however, are the valid purposes
5. Congress delegated decision-making power to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission ("CFTC" or "Commission") with respect to permitting or prohibiting the
practice of dual trading. See Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1-26, 6j(l)-(2)
(1988) [hereinafter Act].
6. The floor broker is only one example of commodity futures professionals who en-
gage in the practice of dual trading. Other examples include the broker who receives
customers' telephone orders and who also trades for his own account, and the futures
commission merchant who processes the customer order and trades for his own proprie-
tary account. Study of the Role of Broker Trading at The Chicago Board of Trade,
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange and the Chicago Rice and Cotton Exchange, Prepared
by Staff of the Three Exchanges in Response to a CFTC Request of Mar. 8, 1989, at 9-10
[hereinafter CBT Report].
7. Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act defines a "floor broker" as
"any person who, in or surrounding any 'pit', 'ring', 'post', or other place provided by a
contract market for the meeting of persons similarly engaged, shall purchase or sell for
any other person any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any
contract market." 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A) (1988).
8. Under Regulation section 1.3(k), "customer" and "commodity customer" have the
same meaning and refer to a customer trading in any commodity named in the definition
of commodity (see Regulation section 1.3(e) for definition of commodity), but does not
include an owner of a proprietary account. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(k) (1989). See infra note 60
(definition of "propriety account").
9. Section 2(a)(l)(A) of the Act defines "futures commission merchants" as "individ-
uals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting or in ac-
cepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any contract market and that, in connection with such solicitation or
acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities or property (or extends credit in lieu
thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or may result
therefrom." 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(A) (1988).
10. The Commission duly noted this point in the release proposing the dual trading
regulations. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,660, 58,661, (1975), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,118, at 20,842.
11. In a recent letter to the CME, the President of the National Cattlemen's Associa-
tion stated: "[tihe FBI investigation of alleged fraud at the futures exchanges has renewed
cattlemen's concerns about the ability of the exchanges to effectively police dual trading
activity.... In light of this, NCA requests that the CME eliminate dual trading in the
cattle contracts." Wortham, Jr., Dual Trade Ban Requested, W. LIVESTOCK J., Mar. 20,
1989, at 1. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 14, 1989, at C-I, col. 2.
12. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
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and important role of dual trading in providing depth and liquidity
to the commodity futures markets.
This Article will analyze both the arguments in favor of and
against banning the practice of dual trading and will conclude that
such a prohibition would be premature at the present time. Specifi-
cally, this Article will address the following: the historical devel-
opment of CFTC-sanctioned dual trading, including the adoption
by the CFTC and various self-regulatory organizations 4 of com-
prehensive regulations designed to restrict abuses associated with
dual trading; fraudulent practices commonly associated with dual
trading and the positive aspects of permitting dual trading; the
stringent penalties already provided by the Commodity Exchange
Act, 5 the rules thereunder and exchange rules for violations of
dual trading regulations; and finally, recommendations for Con-
gressional action during the 1989 CFTC reauthorization proceed-
ings 6 with respect to improving but not eliminating the practice of
dual trading.
II. HISTORY OF DUAL TRADING
A. Congressional Consideration of Dual Trading
Section 6j(l)' 7 and (2)1 s of the Act direct the CFTC 9 to deter-
14. Regulation section 1.3(ee) defines "self-regulatory organization" as a "contract
market (as defined in section 1.3(h)) or a registered futures association under section 17"
of the Commodity Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ee) (1989). The National Futures
Association is currently the only registered futures association. For a further discussion
of section 1.3(h), see infra note 27.
15. 7 U.S.C. § 1-26 (1988).
16. Section 101(b) of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
amended section 12 of the Commodity Exchange Act regarding operations of the Com-
mission, by appropriating funds to the CFTC for only four years so that Congress could
review the Commission's operations at that time. This process of appropriating funds at
set intervals and only after Congressional review is known as "reauthorization." The
CFTC has been reauthorized every four years (with one exception) since 1974, by virtue
of the Futures Trading Act of 1978, the Futures Trading Act of 1982 and the Futures
Trading Act of 1986. Section 106 of the Futures Trading Act of 1986, however, amended
subsection (d) of section 12 of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1988)) to
provide for the appropriation of funds for only a three-year period. Consequently, appro-
priations for the current reauthorization period ended on September 30, 1989. For an
excellent analysis of the CFTC reauthorization process, see Johnson, The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Reauthorization Process. A View From the Trenches, 1979
DET. C.L. REV. 1.
17. Section 6j(l) provides:
The Commission shall within nine months after the effective date of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, and subsequently when it
determines that changes are required, make a determination, after notice and
opportunity for hearing, whether or not a floor broker may trade for his own
account or any account in which such broker has trading discretion, and also
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mine, after notice and opportunity for hearing, whether the prac-
tice of dual trading should be permitted to continue (i.e., whether
an FCM or floor broker should be permitted to trade for his own
account or one over which he has discretion and at the same time
be permitted to execute a customer order for the same futures con-
tract). This section, originally section 203 of the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission Act of 197420 (the "1974 Act"),
resulted from Congressional concern over conflicts of interest in-
herent in the practice of dual trading. Congress was especially
concerned that FCMs or floor brokers would fail to meet their
duty of full loyalty 2' as agents to their customers if they were al-
lowed to simultaneously trade as principal, directly benefitting
themselves or their associates.22 Congress was also concerned that
execute a customer's order for future delivery and, if the Commission deter-
mines that such trades and such executions shall be permitted, the Commission
shall further determine the terms, conditions, and circumstances under which
such trades and such executions shall be conducted: Provided, That any such
determination shall, at a minimum, take into account the effect upon the liquid-
ity of trading of each market: And provided further, That nothing herein shall
be construed to prohibit the Commission from making separate determinations
for different contract markets when such are warranted in the judgment of the
Commission, or to prohibit contract markets from setting terms and conditions
more restrictive than those set by the Commission.
7 U.S.C. § 6j(l) (1988) (emphasis added).
18. Section 6j(2) contains an identical provision regarding FCMs. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 6j(2) (1988).
19. The establishment of the CFTC is prescribed by section 4a of the Act which
provides that the Commission shall be composed of five Commissioners, who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more
than three members of the Commission shall be members of the same political party and
each Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years. Section 4a also provides that
the President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a member
of the Commission as Chairman, who shall serve at the pleasure of the President. 7
U.S.C. § 4a (1988).
20. Act of October 23, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389, 1396 (1974).
21. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1974).
22. Regulation section 1.3(aa) defines "associated person" as follows:
any natural person who is associated in any of the following capacities with: (1)
A futures commission merchant as a partner, officer, or employee (or any natu-
ral person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), in any
capacity which involves (i) the solicitation or acceptance of customers' or op-
tion customers' orders (other than in a clerical capacity) or (ii) the supervision
of any person or persons so engaged; (2) An introducing broker as a partner,
officer, employee, or agent (or any natural person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions), in any capacity which involves (i) the solicitation
or acceptance of customer's or option customer's orders (other than in a clerical
capacity) or (ii) the supervision of any person or persons so engaged; (3) A
commodity pool operator as a partner, officer, employee, consultant, or agent
(or any natural person occupying a similar status or performing similar func-
tions), in any capacity which involves (i) the solicitation of funds, securities or
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adequate procedural safeguards did not exist. At the time the 1974
Act was adopted, time-stamping 23 was not a required practice; con-
sequently, the ability to detect dual trading abuses was extremely
difficult. In this regard, a report of the Comptroller General of the
United States concluded that:
Since timing information is not required on a broker's personal
trades, the abusive practice of a broker trading for his own ac-
count while he has a customer's order in hand is virtually impos-
sible to detect because the time sequence of the broker's trades
cannot be determined from the records.24
The legislative history of section 6j25 indicates that Congress was
aware of both the conflicts of interest inherent in the practice of
dual trading as well as the positive aspects of dual trading26 (i.e.,
that it promotes liquidity in the various contract markets 2 and ex-
pertise among floor brokers). Yet, Congress did not ban or even
property for a participation in a commodity pool, or (ii) the supervision of any
person or persons so engaged; or (4) A commodity trading advisor as a partner,
officer, employee, consultant, or agent (or any natural person occupying a simi-
lar status or performing similar functions), in any capacity which involves: (i)
the solicitation of a client's or prospective client's discretionary account, or (ii)
the supervision of any person or persons so engaged; and (5) A leverage transac-
tion merchant as a partner, officer, employee, or agent (or any natural person
occupying a similar status or performing similar functions), in any capacity
which involves: (i) the solicitation or acceptance of leverage customers' orders
(other than in a clerical capacity) for leverage transactions ... or (ii) the super-
vision of any person or persons so engaged.
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(aa) (1989).
23. Time-stamping is required of any contract market member who receives a cus-
tomer's or option customer's order not in the form of a written record. Upon receipt of
such an order, the member must immediately prepare a written record, including the
account identification and order number, and must record thereon, by time-stamp or
other recording device, the date and time to the nearest minute the order is received.
Subparagraph (3) of Regulation section 1.35, however, exempts from this requirement
members of a contract market whose customer is another member, present on the floor
when the order is received, and who, in executing such transaction, notes on his trading
card or other record, the time of execution to the nearest minute. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(a)(2)-
(3) (1989).
24. Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress on Improve-
ments Needed in Regulation of Commodity Futures Trading (June 24, 1975), Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,051, at 20,647-20, 20,652. See also Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
(Number 6, Extra Edition).
25. S. REP. No. 93-1131, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5843, 5871.
26. See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the posi-
tive aspects of dual trading.
27. Regulation section 1.3(h) defines "contract market" as "a board of trade desig-
nated by the Commission as a contract market under the Commodity Exchange Act." 17
C.F.R. § 1.3(h) (1989).
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restrict dual trading. 28 Rather, Congress delegated those determi-
nations to the Commission, concluding that it did not have suffi-
cient evidence to make such a determination on its own.29
B. CFTC Regulation of Dual Trading
Following the enactment of the 1974 Act, and pursuant to the
mandate established under section 6j of the Act, the CFTC estab-
lished an Advisory Committee on Regulation of Contract Markets
and Self-Regulatory Associations (the "Advisory Committee").
The Advisory Committee concluded that dual trading was neces-
sary to provide depth and liquidity to the contract markets, but
regulation was also needed to control potential abuses of dual trad-
ing.3" The Advisory Committee's report3" further suggested that a
study be conducted of time-stamping mechanisms or other systems
that would permit more precise recordation of the time at which
trades are executed. As a result of the Advisory Committee's
study, on December 23, 1976, the Commission adopted the follow-
ing regulations designed to prevent abuses associated with dual
trading.32
1. Floor Broker Trading Standards
Regulation section 155.213 requires each contract market to
adopt a set of rules to prevent abuses of the relationships between
its floor broker members and the persons for whom such members
execute transactions. The contract market rules are required, at a
minimum, to include the provisions discussed below.
First, Regulation sections 155.2(a) 34 and (b), 35 generally referred
to as the "customer first rules," prohibit the practice of "front-
running ' ' 36 or trading ahead of a customer. The customer first rulesprohibit floor brokers from purchasing or selling any commodity
28. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,660, 58,661 (1975), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,118, at 20,842.
29. Id.
30. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH), 20,242, at 20,842.
31. The Advisory Committee's report is known as the "Kane-Weinberg Report."
Copies of the report are available for inspection at the Commission's offices at 2033 K
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20581.
32. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,136 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH), 20,242, at 21,293.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1989).
34. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(a) (1989).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(b) (1989).
36. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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for future delivery for his own account or for any account in which
he has an interest while holding another person's order for the
purchase or sale of the same commodity, which is executable at the
market price 37 or the price at which such purchase or sale can be
made for the floor broker's own account. Floor brokers, however,
are allowed to trade in the opposite direction of their customers.38
Second, Regulation section 155.2(c) 3 9 is designed to prevent a
floor broker from trading ahead of customers, not for the benefit of
his own account but for those customer accounts over which the
floor broker has discretion.' It requires that the contract market
rules prohibit each floor broker from executing any transaction for
another person's account for which buying and/or selling orders
can be placed or originated, or for which transactions can be exe-
cuted by such floor broker, without the prior specific consent of the
account owner, except that orders for such accounts may be placed
with another floor broker on the contract market for execution.4'
This prohibition, however, does not extend to accounts in which
the floor broker's discretion is limited to selecting the precise time
and price at which a customer originated order is executed.42
Third, Regulation section 155.2(d)-(h),43 respectively, require
that each floor broker be prohibited from: (1) disclosing the orders
of other persons;" (2) taking the other side of any order of another
37. The CFTC has declined to clarify the term "market price," but it has stated that
a floor broker who is holding a customer order that is executable at or near the market
price should concentrate his efforts on executing that order and not on trading for his
own account. The Commission has stated the "regulation is intended to require that
under all circumstances the customer must come first." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,136
(1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,293.
38. The Commission maintains that this practice may benefit customers by softening
the impact of their orders on the market, thereby helping the customer to get a better
execution of his order. Id.
39. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(c) (1989).
40. Regulation section 15.00(h) defines "discretionary account" as a "commodity fu-
tures or commodity option trading account for which buying and/or selling orders can be
placed or originated, or for which transactions can be effected, under a general authoriza-
tion and without specific consent of the customer, whether the general authorization for
such orders or transactions is pursuant to a written agreement, power of attorney, or
otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 15.00(h) (1989).
41. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(c) (1989). According to the Commission, this regulation "is
designed to prevent floor brokers from placing their personal trading interests ahead of
their customer's interests when exercising trading discretion over such customer's ac-
counts." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 54,136 (1976). [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,294.
42. Id. at 21,295.
43. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(d)-(h) (1989).
44. The underlying purpose of this regulation is to prohibit a floor broker from dis-
closing customer orders to other persons who may take advantage of that knowledge.
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person revealed to a floor broker by reason of his relationship to
such other person (except with such other person's prior consent
and in conformity with contract market rules);45 (3) prearranging
trades;4 6 (4) allocating trades among accounts;47 or (5) withholding
or withdrawing from the market any order or part of an order of
another person for the convenience of another member of the con-
Yet, such disclosure may be made in the normal course of "legitimate business activities,"
such as when a floor broker places orders for a discretionary account with another floor
broker (as required by Regulation section 155.2(c)). This type of disclosure would clearly
be permitted. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,137 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,295.
45. This, in effect, allows a customer to waive his right to a fully competitive execu-
tion. See 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 310 (1989).
46. The prohibition on prearranged trading is designed to augment the requirement
set forth in Regulation section 1.38 that "all purchases and sales of any commodity for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of a contract market shall be executed openly
and competitively by open outcry or posting of bids and offers or by other equally open
and competitive methods .... " 17 C.F.R. § 1.38 (1989).
47. This regulation "is designed to prohibit floor brokers from allocating the best
trades to their own accounts and the accounts of their preferred customers to the detri-
ment of their other customers." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,137 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,295. For example, a floor broker or
FCM may receive a large number of customer orders to be executed "at the market."
Frequently, these orders will be executed by the floor broker or FCM in a block, although
not usually in a single trade. This type of execution will often result in different prices for
various trades. It is at this point that a floor broker or FCM must allocate the trades
among his customers. Yet, the CFTC has stated that the broker is required to apply a
first in, best execution price type of allocation when such allocation is necessitated by the
rare situation of a broker holding multiple individual orders for the purchase or sale of
the same number of contracts in the same commodity and delivery month.
For example, assume the facts in the following situation: Dewey, Cheatham & Howe
("DCH"), a registered FCM with its own floor operation at the CBT, receives five nearly
simultaneous buy orders for ten contracts each (50,000 bushels per order) of August
soybeans. When the orders are placed, soybean contracts are trading at an index of 5.75
1/2. The five orders are from the following individuals and are received by DCH at the
times indicated in parenthesis: Able (10:35:10 a.m.), Baker (10:35:12 a.m.), Charlie
(10:35:14 a.m.), Daniel (10:35:16 a.m.), and Edward (10:35:18 a.m.). Able, Baker, and
Charlie are infrequent customers of DCH, whereas Daniel and Edward are preferred
customers.
Assume further that the orders are executed as follows: Edward's order is executed first
at 10:42:15 a.m. at an index of 5.75 1/2; Daniel's order is executed second at 10:42:20
a.m. at an index of 5.77 1/2; Charlie's order is executed third at 10:42:25 at an index of
5.78; Baker's order is executed fourth at 10:42:30 at an index of 5.82 1/4; and Able's
order is executed fifth at 10:42:35 at an index of 5.84. Even though all five orders were
received by DCH within two seconds of each other, and notwithstanding the fact that
Edward's and Daniel's orders were executed first and second, respectively, applying the
first in, best execution price type of allocation, DCH cannot allocate the two lowest trades
(5.75 1/2 and 5.77 1/2), to the accounts of its preferred customers, Daniel and Edward.
Instead, it must allocate the best trades in the order that they were received by DCH. Cf
1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at 152-53 (recently, the CFTC has indicated
that other methods of allocating trades may be appropriate).
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tract market.48
Finally, with respect to clearing member confirmations, Regula-
tion section 155.2(i)4 9 requires that every execution of a transaction
on the floor by a member be confirmed promptly with the opposite
floor broker or floor trader." The confirmation must identify price
or premium, quantity, future or commodity option, and respective
clearing members.5 This regulation further provides that the
Commission may exempt a contract market from this requirement
if: (1) the contract market can explain "why it cannot require the
prompt identification of respective clearing members without seri-
ously disrupting the functions of its marketplace;" and (2) the con-
tract market proposes a "rule which will insure that the opposite
sides of every trade executed on the contract market can be effec-
tively matched and will be accepted by a clearing member for
clearance or will be otherwise sufficiently guaranteed."52 With re-
spect to the former, the contract market must make a significant
showing of market disruption in order to propose an alternative
rule. 3 According to the CFTC Release adopting the dual trading
regulations, the Commission was concerned that the failure to re-
quire prompt confirmation with opposing clearing members might
create situations in which the opposite sides of transactions would
be improperly matched.5 4 The Commission felt that this would
make effective transaction time sequence reconstruction and trad-
ing surveillance more difficult and might lead to dual trading
abuses.
48. This regulation is designed to prevent floor brokers from acting against the best
interests of their customers for the benefit of other floor brokers and traders. For exam-
ple, a floor broker holding a large sell order in a particular contract would be prevented
from withholding that order while other brokers and traders first get out of their posi-
tions in that contract. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,137 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,295.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(i) (1989).
50. According to the CFTC, "prompt confirmation" serves two purposes: first, it in-
sures accurate matching of trades, which reduces the number of out-trades; and second, it
insures, to the extent possible, that each transaction will be guaranteed by the financial
integrity of both the particular clearing member and the clearing house of the contract
market. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,138 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,296.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(i) (1989). Regulation section 1.3(c) defines the term "clearing
member" as "any person who is a member of, or enjoys the privilege of clearing trades in
his own name through the clearing organization of a contract market." 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(c)
(1989).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(c) (1989).
53. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,137 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,296.
54. Id.
1989]
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2. FCM Trading Standards
With respect to FCMs, the Commission chose not to require
contract markets to adopt rules that conform to the minimum
standards set forth above for floor brokers. Rather, it decided to
impose a direct obligation upon each FCM to establish and to en-
force internal rules, procedures and controls in order to prevent
abuses of the relationship of the FCM and its affiliated persons55 to
customers.5 6 The CFTC based its determination on its perception
of "the present inadequacies in the rule enforcement programs of
many contract markets."57 Therefore, the CFTC adopted Regula-
tion section 155.3,1 8 which establishes certain minimum safeguards
that must be adopted by all FCMs. It includes the provisions dis-
cussed below.
First, Regulation section 155.3(a)(1), 59 also known as the "cus-
tomer first rule," requires customer orders executable at or near
the market price to be transmitted to the appropriate contract mar-
ket floor before orders for the FCM's proprietary account' (or or-
55. Regulation section 155.1 defines the term "affiliated person" of a futures commis-
sion merchant or of an introducing broker as "any general partner, officer, director,
owner of more than ten percent of the equity interest, associated person or employee of
the futures commission merchant or of the introducing broker, and any relative or spouse
of any of the foregoing persons, or any relative of such spouse, who shares the same home
as any of the foregoing persons." 17 C.F.R. § 155.1 (1989).
56. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,137 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,297.
57. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,138 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,298.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3 (1989).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(a)(1) (1989).
60. Regulation section 1.3(y) defines "proprietary account" as
a commodity futures or commodity option trading account carried on the books
and records of an individual, a partnership, corporation or other type associa-
tion, (1) for one of the following persons, or (2) of which ten percent or more is
owned by one of the following persons, or an aggregate of ten percent or more
of which is owned by more than one of the following persons: (i) Such individ-
ual himself, or such partnership, corporation or association itself; (ii) In the case
of a partnership, a general partner in such partnership; (iii) In the case of a
limited partnership, a limited or special partner in such partnership whose du-
ties include: (A) The management of the partnership business or any part
thereof, (B) The handling of the trades or customer funds of customers or op-
tion customers of such partnership, (C) The keeping of records pertaining to the
trades or customer funds of customers or option customers of such partnership,
or (D) The signing or co-signing of checks or drafts on behalf of such partner-
ship; (iv) In the case of a corporation or association, an officer, director or
owner of ten percent or more of the capital stock, of such organization; (v) An
employee of such an individual, partnership, corporation or association whose
duties include: (A) The management of the business of such individual, partner-
ship, corporation or association or any part thereof, (B) The handling of the
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ders for accounts in which it has an interest or over which it
exercises discretion) in the same commodity are transmitted to the
floor of that contract market.6' Regulation section 155.3(a)(2) 62
imposes this same obligation on the FCM's affiliates. 63 Therefore,
it requires that each FCM take appropriate measures to prevent its
affiliated persons from circumventing the requirement set forth in
subparagraph (1) of the rule by placing orders with other FCMs.
With respect to order confidentiality, Regulation section
155.3(b)(1) 61 makes it unlawful for an FCM to unnecessarily dis-
close an order of another being held by it or its affiliate. Lastly,
Regulation section 155.3(b)(2) 65 prohibits any FCM from know-
ingly taking the other side of an order of another person, revealed
to them by reason of their relationship to such other person, except
with the prior consent of such person and in conformity with con-
tract market rules.66
trades or customer funds of customers or option customers of such individual,
partnership, corporation or association, (C) The keeping of records pertaining
to the trades or customer funds of customers or option customers of such indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, or association, or (D) The signing or co-sign-
ing of checks or drafts on behalf of such individual, partnership, corporation or
association; (vi) A spouse or minor dependent living in the same household of
any of the foregoing persons; (vii) A business affiliate that directly or indirectly
controls such individual, partnership, corporation or association; (viii) A busi-
ness affiliate that, directly or indirectly is controlled by or is under common
control with, such individual, partnership, corporation or association. Provided
however, That an account owned by any shareholder or member of a coopera-
tive association of producers, within the meaning of section 5e and 6a of the
Act, which association is registered as a futures commission merchant and car-
ries such account on its records, shall be deemed to be an account of a customer
or option customer and not a proprietary account of such association, unless the
shareholder or member is an officer, director or manager of the association.
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(y) (1989).
61. With respect to branch offices of an FCM, however, the Commission has rejected
the view that Regulation section 155.3(a)(1) requires "that clerical employees, such as
teletype operators, who receive orders from several associated persons continuously and
often simultaneously for mechanical transmission to the appropriate contract market for
execution, arrange those orders so that customer's orders are always submitted prior to
proprietary orders." 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,139 n.19 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer
Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,298 n.18.
62. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(a)(2) (1989).
63. For a definition of "affiliated person," see supra note 55.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(b)(1) (1989).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(b)(2) (1989).
66. This regulation augments section 6b(D) of the Act, which makes it unlawful for
any member of a contract market to, among other things, "become the buyer in respect to
any selling order.., or become the seller in respect to any buying order" of a customer
without his consent. 7 U.S.C. § 6(b)(D) (1988). See infra text accompanying note 167.
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3. FCMs' Affiliated Person Trading Standards67
The CFTC adopted Regulation sections 155.3(c) and (d) to as-
sist FCMs in supervising the trading activities of their affiliated
persons. This section generally provides FCMs with notification
and information concerning the accounts maintained by their affili-
ated persons with other FCMs.
Regulation section 155.3(C) 61 makes it unlawful for any FCM to
"knowingly handle the account of any affiliated person of another
FCM" unless: (1) the FCM handles the account pursuant to writ-
ten authorization by a person employed by the other FCM having
responsibility for surveillance over such account; (2) upon receipt
of such order the FCM immediately prepares a written record of
such order and records thereon the date and time, to the nearest
minute at which the order was received, by time-stamp or other
device; and (3) the FCM transmits, on a regular basis to the other
FCM with which such person is affiliated, copies of all statements
for the account of such person and copies of all written, time-
stamped records prepared upon the receipt of orders for such
account.
Regulation section 155.3(d) 69 additionally prohibits any affiliated
person of an FCM to have an account, directly or indirectly, with
another FCM unless: (1) written authorization is received from a
designated official of the FCM with which such person is affiliated
for the maintenance of such account; and (2) upon receipt of orders
for such account, copies of all statements for it and copies of all
written, time-stamped records prepared by such other FCM are
transmitted on a regular basis to the FCM with which such person
is affiliated.
4. Transaction Time Sequence Reconstruction Capability
In adopting record-keeping requirements regarding dual trading,
the Commission stated:
[D]rawing a meaningful conclusion with respect to the signifi-
cance of dual trading abuses in the absence of a rapid and accu-
rate transaction time sequence reconstruction capability ... [and]
... [t]he ability of the Commission to analyze in a meaningful
way the effects of dual trading on market liquidity in the absence
67. See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,139 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,299.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(c) (1989).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 155.3(d) (1989).
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of such reconstruction capability is ... hampered.7"
The Commission was concerned that, under their then-current sys-
tems and procedures, the exchanges would be unable to detect
abuses such as front-running and bucketing, even if they were
occurring with some frequency. 2 The Commission likely took the
view that it could not completely fulfill its statutory responsibilities
under section 4j7 3 of the Act if the contract markets did not have
the ability to rapidly and accurately reconstruct the time and se-
quence of transactions during any given trading period. Accord-
ingly, the Commission adopted the following amendments to
Regulation section 1.35.
The CFTC adopted Regulation section 1.35(h), 5 which requires
all contract markets to establish and maintain a price change regis-
ter capable of recording each change in price within ten seconds
after such change. In addition, Regulation section 135(g)(2) 76 re-
quires the contract markets to implement, as soon as possible, tim-
ing and record-keeping systems and procedures that will enable
them to show the mechanically or electronically verified execution
time of each futures trade to at least the nearest minute.7
Finally, pursuant to Regulation section 1.35(e),'7 all information
required by the regulation must be kept in a single record that
shows the following: transaction date, time, quantity and, as appli-
cable, underlying commodity, contract for future delivery or physi-
cal, 79 price or premium,80 delivery month8 or expiration date
70. 41 Fed. Reg. 56,134, 56,139 (1976), [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,300.
71. See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text (further discussion of front-run-
ning and bucketing).
72. Id.
73. 7 U.S.C. § 6j (1988).
74. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35 (1989).
75. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(h) (1989).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(g)(1) (1989). Section 1.35(g)(1) was amended in 1986. It previ-
ously required the exchanges to determine only the thirty-minute period within which
each trade was executed.
77. The one-minute bracket in which exchanges identify futures transactions has been
criticized by the Government Accounting Office ("GAO") as insufficient to record the
actual price of the transaction. Due to the efficiency of floor traders, several trades can be
executed within one minute. Chicago Futures Market: Initial Observations on Trade Prac-
tice Abuses, United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Commit-
tee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry U.S. Senate GAO/GGD-89-58 (Mar. 1989)
[hereinafter GAO Report]. See infra text accompanying note 138 (a more detailed dis-
cussion of the GAO Report).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(e) (1989).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(11) (1989). "Physical" means "any good, article, service, right or
interest upon which a commodity option may be traded in accordance with the Act and
... regulations." Id.
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whether the transaction involved a put or a call, strike price,82 floor
broker or floor trader buying, clearing member buying, floor bro-
ker or floor trader selling, or clearing member selling. In addition,
both the buying and selling customer type indicators 3 must be
shown on the record of each futures trade. The records must be
kept in computer readable form on compatible magnetic tapes or
discs for a sixty-day period in a format and coding structure ap-
proved by the CFTC.
C. Exchange Regulation of Dual Trading
Pursuant to the requirement set forth in Regulation section
155.2, s4 the commodity futures exchanges have adopted rules
designed to comply with the CFTC's dual trading regulations.
Both the CBT8 5 and the CME s6 have adopted rules that are sub-
80. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(ii) (1989).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(1) (1989).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(kk) (1989).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(e) (1989). Regulation section 1.35(e) states that the "customer
and option customer type indicators shall show, with respect to each person executing the
trade, whether such person: (1) Was trading for his own account; (2) Was trading for his
clearing member's house account; (3) Was trading for another member present on the
exchange floor, or an account controlled by such member; or (4) Was trading for any
other type of customer or option customer." Id.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1989).
85. The CBT has adopted the following rules regulating the practice of dual trading:
Rule 350.05(a)-(b) (substantially similar to the prohibition on dual trading in proprietary
and affiliate's accounts found in Regulation § 155.2(a)-(b)); Rule 350.05(c) (substantially
similar to the prohibition on dual trading in discretionary accounts found in Regulation
§ 155.2(c)); Rule 350.05(d) (substantially similar to the prohibition on disclosing orders
of other persons found in Regulation § 155.2(d)); Rule 350.05(e) (substantially similar to
the prohibition on taking the other side of orders of another person as set forth in Regula-
tion § 155.2(e)); Rule 350.05(f) (substantially similar to the prohibition against prear-
ranged trading found in Regulation § 155.2(f)); Rule 350.05(g) (substantially similar to
the prohibition against withholding or withdrawing from the market any order or part of
an order of another person for the convenience of another member of the contract market
found in Regulation § 155.2(h)); Rule 350.05(k) (substantially similar to the prohibition
on allocating trades among accounts found in Regulation § 155.2(g)); and Rule 350.050)
(substantially similar to the requirement set forth in Regulation § 1.35(g)(1) that parties
to a transaction properly notify the pit recorder of the price at which trades have been
consummated). In addition to those rules tracking the CFTC regulations in language and
format, the CBT has also adopted rules prohibiting the practices commonly referred to as
"accommodation trading" (Rule 350.05(i)) and "curb trading" (Rule 350.05(h)) (see in-
fra notes 105 and 109, respectively, for definitions of these terms). Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago Rules and Regulations, Exchange Floor Operations and Procedures Rule
350.05(a)-(1), at 316 (July 1989) [hereinafter Rules of the CBT].
86. Similarly, the CME has adopted the following rules regulating the practice of
dual trading: Rule 530-Priority of Customers' Orders; Rule 531-Trading Against
Customers' Orders Prohibited; Rule 532-Disclosing Orders Prohibited; Rule 533-Si-
multaneous Buying and Selling Orders for Different Principals Executed by One Trader;
Rule 534-Simultaneous Buying and Selling Orders for the Same Principals Prohibited;
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stantially similar to both the language and format of the CFTC
regulations. The CME, however, has deviated slightly by adopting
a rule that restricts the practice of dual trading on the top step of
the S&P 500 futures pit.87 In addition, other exchanges have
adopted rules designed to comply with Regulation section 155.2,
for example, the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc.
("KCBT"),88 the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange ("CSCE"),89
the Commodity Exchange ("COMEX"),90 the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange ("MGE"),9  the New York Cotton Exchange
("NYCE"),92 the New York Futures Exchange ("NYFE"),93 and
the New York Mercantile Exchange ("NYMEX"). 94
It is readily apparent, from this recitation of CFTC and ex-
change rules, that procedures already exist for the detection and
prevention of abuses associated with dual trading. The exchanges
have clearly met their mandate under Regulation section 155.295 to
Rule 536-Record for Orders and Personal Transactions; Rule 537-Confirmations to
Customers; Rule 528-Change in Last Sale Price; and Rule 529-Withholding Orders
Prohibited. Rules of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (revised and amended and effec-
tive through June 30, 1989) [hereinafter Rules of the CME].
87. The so-called "Top Step Rule" provides that "[a] member shall not trade an S&P
500 futures contract for his own account while on the top step of the S&P 500 futures pit,
except that a member may liquidate a position that resulted from an error. A member
who has executed an S&P 500 futures contract order while on the top step of the S&P 500
futures pit, shall not thereafter on the same day trade S&P 500 futures contracts for his
own account." Rules of the CME, Closing Date Orders Rule 541 at 23, supra note 86,
ch. 5, at 15. The Top Step Rule is the indirect result of a petition filed by local traders
and signed by more than 800 floor members in 1987. The petition requested a complete
ban on dual trading in the entire S&P 500 futures pit but was rejected in a membership
vote on April 13, 1987. The CME board recommended the adoption of the "Top Step
Rule" as a compromise measure and contended that 95% of all customer orders were
executed on the top step. How Pit Practices Are Shaking S&P 500 Image, FUTURES, May
1987, at 42; see also Pierog & Wilson, Open Season On Open Outcry? FUTURES, Mar.
1989, at 60; How S&P Rules Could Change, FUTURES, May 1987, at 48; Chicago Sun
Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at 45, col. 1. See infra note 114 for an explanation of the S&P index.
88. By-Laws, Rules and Regulations of the Board of Trade of Kansas City, Missouri,
Inc., Floor Broker Rules 1130.00-1138.00, at 1107-08.
89. Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, Guide Inc. (CCH) 2091, Dual Trading Rule
3.10 (Apr. 1988).
90. Commodity Exchange Inc., By-laws and Rules, Dual Trading Rule 4.31, at 4-15
(adopted Oct. 4, 1982).
91. Rules and Regulations of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Futures and Options,
Trading Rule 750.00, at 706 (July 1, 1987).
92. By-Laws and Rules of the New York Cotton Exchange, Thirty-Third Edition,
Trading Standards for Floor Brokers Rule 1.05, at 266 (May 1989).
93. New York Futures Exchange Guide (CCH) 3085, Trading Rule 416 (Mar.
1983).
94. New York Mercantile Exchange Guide (CCH) 3609, Trading Standards For
Floor Brokers Rule 1.05, at 266 (May 1989).
95. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2 (1989).
Loyola University Law Journal
comply with the minimum requirements of the CFTC's dual trad-
ing regulations. Nevertheless, thirteen years have passed since the
Commission adopted its dual trading regulations. Technological
changes in the way futures contracts are traded clearly will necessi-
tate refining current rules. A review of specific recommendations
for Congressional action regarding such rule changes will be set
forth in Section VI below.
III. NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF DUAL TRADING: PROHIBITED
PRACTICES, INCLUDING "FRONT-RUNNING" AND
"BUCKETING"
In order to understand the way in which dual trading can lead to
abuses, one must be familiar with the process of how futures con-
tracts are traded.96 Generally, there is a ten-step process in com-
modity futures trading, although some steps in the process occur
simultaneously. First, the customer places a buy or sell order with
an FCM through either a telephone or computer terminal. The
FCM prepares an office order ticket, which is then time-stamped.
Second, the order is transmitted by the FCM to a trading booth on
the exchange trading floor by telephone, teletype or electronic or-
der routing system. 97 A floor order ticket is prepared and the or-
der is time-stamped "in." Third, a floor runner physically carries
the customer's order from the trading booth to a floor broker or
floor trader 98 in the pit located in the middle of the trading floor, or
96. GAO Report, supra note 77, ch. 1, at 10.
97. The CME is developing two systems, known as TOPS (trade order-processing
system) and CUBS (CME universal broker station), that are designed to speed up the
execution time of customer orders by giving FCMs the capability to transmit customer
orders from its office terminal to CUBS located on the periphery of the trading pits. By
reducing the distance that presently exists between floor trading booths and the pits, the
TOPS/CUBS systems will eliminate the need for runners. A significant feature of the
TOPS/CUBS systems will be the ability to pinpoint the exact time customer orders enter
and exit the pits, thereby improving transaction time sequence reconstruction capabili-
ties. Similarly, the CBT has begun testing a prototype for its new electronic order routing
system ("EOS"). In contrast to the TOPS/CUBS system, EOS will print out orders on
the top step of the two Treasury Bond Pits where floor brokers stand. Behof, You Can
Almost Hear A Sigh Of Relief In The Pits, Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 1989, at 33; see also,
Technology Already Set To Enhance Audit Trail, FUTURES, Mar. 1989, at 64; McGraw
Hill, CBT Plans To Begin Testing Prototype For New Order-Routing System June 1, SEC.
WK., May 15, 1989, at 7. For further discussion of the Chicago exchanges' computer
technology, see infra note 102 and accompanying text.
98. According to Regulation section 1.3(x), "this term means a member of a contract
market who, on the floor of such contract market, executes a futures trade or a commod-
ity option transaction for his own account or an account controlled by him, or has such a
futures trade or commodity option transaction made for him." 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(x) (1989).
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the order is "flashed" 9 9 into the pit through headsets worn by floor
brokers or floor traders. Fourth, the floor broker or floor trader
attempts to find matching orders by using "open outcry"'"° and
hand signals to communicate price and quantity terms with other
floor brokers and traders.
Fifth, after the customer's order is filled, the floor broker con-
firms the trade with the opposite party and records on his trading
card the price and quantity at which the order was filled, the time
of execution and the identity of the opposing side of the trade.
Sixth, a floor runner then picks up the floor order tickets and re-
turns them to the trading booth, or the information is "flashed"
back to the trading booth where the order ticket is time-stamped
"out." Seventh, the trading booth reports the trade execution to
the FCM, who records the trade price on the office order ticket and
time-stamps it. Eighth, the customer is provided with a written
confirmation of the trade. Ninth, the exchange price reporter re-
lays price changes as they occur to central quotation computers.
The central price quotation computers then transmit price infor-
mation to electronic priceboards facing the trading floor. This in-
formation is simultaneously transmitted around the world to the
offices of trading companies through computerized information
systems such as Telerate, Intex or Reuters. Finally, clearing firms
pick up the trading cards, 10 which are generally confirmed with
the customer the next morning. The Clearing House then calls for
losses to be paid-up and redistributes profits. This process is re-
ferred to as "marking contracts to market." It is designed to insure
that the Clearing House has sufficient funds to guarantee each of
its clearing members' ability to pay off its debts to other members.
Notwithstanding the adoption of dual trading regulations by the
CFTC and the exchanges, as well as the implementation of com-
99. The use of wired headsets at the CBT was first introduced in 1986 and was
designed to allow orders to be more efficiently executed as they are received on the ex-
change floor. Currently, the two Chicago exchanges are working on developing hand-
held computer terminals to be used by all floor brokers and traders. The system, called
Automated Data Input Terminal ("AUDITs"), would replace the manual trading card
system now used. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at 77, ch. 1, col. 2.
100. Open outcry is a method of public auction in which bids and offers are verbally
and openly offered to all floor participants. GAO Report, supra note 77, at 8.
101. At the CBT, clearing firms are required to pick up trading cards "at such times
and in such manner as designated by the Board of Directors." Card Collection Rule
332.05, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 313. Presently, the Board requires CBT
clearing firms to pick up trading cards twice daily-at 10:30 a.m. and at the close of
trading. The CBT, however, has recently proposed a requirement that clearing firms pick
up their clearing members' trading cards at one-hour intervals throughout the day. See
infra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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puterized tracking systems 112 by the latter, the recent FBI investi-
gation has brought to light reported allegations of various abuses
102. Trading through computers is believed to provide a better transaction time se-
quence reconstruction capability than is presently provided by the "open outcry" system.
The CME has developed GLOBEX, an after-hours system for automated trading that the
CFTC recently approved and which has been successful in attracting the New York Mer-
cantile Exchange, the Sydney Futures Exchange and the Matif Exchange in Paris as
GLOBEX participants. The CBT had also begun developing its own system, named Au-
rora, which the CBT asserted would be more advanced than the mere order-matching
capabilities of GLOBEX. Aurora, the CBT argued, would continue the tradition of open
outcry by displaying all orders and allowing traders to view the market as a whole, much
as they presently can. Recently, however, the two Chicago exchanges have stated that
they may scrap plans to create two separate systems, in favor of a single, after-hours
electronic trading system to be developed jointly by them. Nevertheless, neither
GLOBEX, Aurora, nor any hybrid system will be capable of providing adequate transac-
tion time sequence reconstruction capabilities until all trading, and not just after-hours
trading, is done electronically. In the meantime, the exchanges must use current systems,
which are dependent upon human input of raw data. Journal of Commerce, Mar. 3,
1989, at 9A, col. 2; see also, Chicago Tribune, May 31, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2; Financial
Times, May 31, 1989, at 26.
Currently, the two Chicago exchanges employ similar computer systems for analyzing
audit trail data. The CBT has developed the Computerized Trade Reconstruction Sys-
tem ("CTR" system); it gathers information from exchange member's trading cards, in-
cluding the executing broker, executing firm, order entry time, quantity, price, order or
trading card number, opposite broker and firm, and half-hour time bracket for every
trade. In addition, independent CBT employees enter each price change and the time
thereof into the CTR system. The CBT then attempts to correlate the data and to calcu-
late the time of each trade to the nearest minute or less. The CBT then uses what it calls
CTR Plus, a surveillance system that analyzes the CTR data and attempts to detect po-
tential violations of exchange rules. CTR Plus attempts to isolate patterns of trading
activity between two or more traders. Recently, the Board of Directors of the CBT set
aside a $1 million fund to pay for a new surveillance system called Oracle. CBT Report,
supra note 6, at 38-43. The CME system is called Compliance Automated Trade Surveil-
lance System ("CATSS") and employs a similar methodology in correlating data.
In contrast to the CBT and the CME, NYMEX employs a "pit card submission sys-
tem" that requires transaction-by-transaction submission of trade data (similar to that
required by the two Chicago exchanges), to independent exchange officials who time-
stamp the pit card immediately upon receipt. The data from the pit cards is then entered
into NYMEX's computer system where it is analyzed by the Compliance Department of
the exchange. NYMEX also uses the data from the pit cards to create a "Streetbook"
that provides a chronological trade sequence based on the time-stamped pit cards. The
potential advantage of the NYMEX system, at least in comparison to the system used by
the two Chicago exchanges, is the requirement of transaction-by-transaction submission
of the pit cards. By requiring such immediate disposition of the cards, the exchange
arguably reduces the amount of time in which a floor broker or trader might falsify infor-
mation. New York Mercantile Exchange Guide (CCH) 3644, Trading Standards for
Floor Brokers Rule 6.90. See also United States Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry (May 17, 1989) (statement of Z. Lou Guttman, Chairman of the Board of
Directors of the New York Mercantile Exchange at 3-4).
In addition to the foregoing, and as previously noted, the two Chicago exchanges are
currently developing order-processing systems that may increase transaction time se-
quence reconstruction capabilities and complement existing CTR systems. See supra note
97 (for further discussion of these systems).
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by floor brokers and floor traders at both the CBT and the CME. "3
These include the following types of actions, all of which share the
common objective of avoiding competitive order execution: (1) pre-
arranged trading,'" (2) accommodation trading,' 5 (3) front-run-
ning,106 (4) bucketing,"°7 (5) wash trading,'0 8 (6) curb trading,'°9
(7) cuffing,110 and (8) cross-trading.I' Although each of these ac-
tivities may be engaged in by "dual traders," they are not all
unique to them, and in fact, may be engaged in by other market
participants. Nevertheless, some of the alleged abuses most com-
monly associated with dual trading are unique to that practice,
although not necessarily inherent in it, and therefore deserve
greater analysis." 12
103. Widespread abuse associated with dual trading also has been reportedly alleged
against other exchanges, such as the five New York exchanges and, most notably, the
New York Mercantile Exchange. On May 4, 1989, the CFTC served subpoenas at four
of the New York Commodity exchanges. Wall St. J., Mar. 1, 1989, at C-1, col. 2; see also
Zigas, The CFTC Drops Its Kid Gloves, Bus. WK., May 22, 1989, at 142.
104. Agreeing to some aspect of a transaction before it is openly executed on the
exchange floor. GAO Report, supra note 77, ch. 1, at 11.
105. Entering transactions in which one floor broker, in order to assist another floor
participant in indirectly taking the other side of a customer's order, buys and sells from
the broker, the same quantity of the same future at the same price. Id. See also I T.
Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES, FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS
§ 12.48 (1983).
106. Trading for one's personal account or an account in which one has an interest,
while having in hand any executable customer order in that contract. See infra notes 113-
14 and accompanying text.
107. Failure to introduce an order to the marketplace, traditionally occurring when a
broker noncompetitively takes the other side of a customer order to the detriment of the
customer or other members. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
108. Entering or purporting to enter into transactions to provide the appearance of
trading activity without resulting in a change in market position. I T. Russo, supra note
105, at § 12.49. According to one commentator, wash trades "are employed to give a
false appearance of trading and to cause prices to be registered which are not true prices.
They may be entered and recorded as real trades, but by private agreement between the
parties they are either cancelled or washed out by other traders." Id.
109. Trading after the official close of trading. Cohen, Life in the Pits, Chicago Trib-
une, Jan. 29, 1989, at 1.
110. Delaying the filling of customer orders to benefit another member. Id.
S11. Matching one's own customer's orders without offering them competitively on
the trading floor. Id.
112. The distinction among those abuses that do not require the ability of a floor
broker or floor trader to act as both principal and agent in order to accomplish the fraud-
ulent activity is critical because it underscores the argument that eliminating the practice
of dual trading will not eradicate all, or even any, of the alleged abuses. Dual trading
itself is not an abuse, but rather the vehicle through which various abuses may be
achieved. In this regard, the CBT Report made an illustrative analogy: "[p]rohibition or
restriction of the practice of check writing to eliminate or reduce the use of fraudulent
checks would be ...misdirected . . . .The abuse may still continue through another
vehicle .. .perhaps, misuse of credit cards." Similarly, a ban on dual trading will not
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A. "Front-running"
"Front-running" is a practice engaged in by some floor brokers
and FCM's and involves knowingly trading ahead of customer or-
ders that are large enough to move the market (i.e., change the
market price of a particular contract in which the broker or FCM
either has, or intends to establish, an open position). Typically, the
trader, after learning of such an order by a customer, first trades as
a principal for himself or a friend, before trading the customer's
order as an agent. 113 The following hypothetical illustrates the
practice of front-running a customer's buy order.
Assume that a customer places a market order to purchase 500
September S&P 500 stock index futures contracts. 114 The floor
broker who receives the order knows that such a large buy order is
likely to drive the price of the contract up when other floor brokers
begin to sense the strong demand. Therefore, when the order is
received on the floor of the exchange, the floor broker signals to a
confederate that a large buy order is about to be executed. The
confederate then quietly purchases 100 contracts. Assume for pur-
poses of this example, that at the time of the confederate's
purchase, such contracts are trading at the prevailing index of
350.10 or $17,505,000.
After the confederate completes the purchase, the floor broker
begins soliciting sales in 100 lot increments from other brokers and
traders in order to fill his or her buy order. As expected, other
brokers in the pit anticipate a large buy order and begin to bid the
price of the contract higher. By the time the first four hundred
contracts have been purchased, the index has risen to 353.50. The
floor broker then purchases the remaining 100 contracts from the
confederate at 353.50, or $17,675,000. The confederate, who
purchased the contracts for $17,505,000, then pockets a substantial
profit of $170,000. Typically, the floor broker and the confederate
will either divide the profit, or the confederate will repay the floor
broker with a similar favor in the future.
It is also possible to front-run a sell order. For example, assume
eliminate such abuses but will merely change the way in which they are accomplished.
CBT Report, supra note 6, at 44.
113. 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at § 2.32.
114. The Standard & Poors ("S&P") 500 stock index futures contract is based on the
stock prices of 500 NYSE-listed companies. The profile of the index consists of 80%
industrial companies, 8% utility companies, 4% transportation companies, and 8% fi-
nancial institutions. The contract is dollar-valued at $500 times the prevailing index.
The "tick" size, or minimum trading price change, is .05 and is valued at $25. See gener-
ally Rules of the CME, supra note 86, at ch. 40.
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that, anticipating a rise in the price of soybeans, a floor broker
purchases ten soybean contracts for his own speculative account.
Later that same day, the floor broker receives a large customer sell
order for 1,000 soybean contracts from a grain dealer located in
southern Illinois. Fearing that he has incorrectly predicted the
market trend, and armed with the knowledge that the customer's
large market order will have a depressing effect on the price of
soybean contracts, the floor broker decides to sell for his own ac-
count first, in order to mitigate losses. Only after the floor broker
has liquidated his position is the customer's order executed,
thereby driving down the price of the soybean contracts.
B. "Bucketing"
"Bucketing"'' 15 is a way of shifting losses to clients and profits to
floor brokers. Although the term "bucketing" has been used to
describe a variety of abusive trade practices, it originally denoted
the intentional withholding of an order from the competitive exe-
cution process in order to book the trade privately." 6 Upon receiv-
ing a customer's order, the broker may simply "bucket" the trade
by placing it in his waste basket and representing to his customer
that the trade was executed in the pit. If it is a losing trade, the
broker will pocket the customer's funds; but if it is a winning trade,
the broker will attempt to cover the trade for the benefit of the
unsuspecting customer. On many occasions, brokers have been
unable to cover their customer's trades. Large customer losses
from "bucket shop" operations led to the enactment of an express
prohibition on bucketing under the Act, as well as under a variety
of exchange rules. 117
In its broader sense, an order may be bucketed whenever, re-
gardless of the method used, the customer's order is considered to
have been executed even though it was not offered openly and com-
petitively to all participants in the market."' Thus, so-called "ac-
commodation trading" can also take the form of bucketing in the
sense it denies competitive execution of customer orders.' In
115. Although not defined in the Act, "bucketing" is specifically prohibited by sec-
tion 4b(D), which makes it an unlawful practice to bucket any trade. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D)
(1988). One commentator has stated: "The term bucket lacks a precise meaning but can
be broadly described as any failure to introduce the order into the competitive market-
place." 1 P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at § 2.27.
116. Id. at 309.
117. Id.
118. 1 T. Russo, supra note 105, at § 12.49.
119. According to one source, "the specific reference to 'accommodation trades' in
section 4c(a)(A) rather than in section 4b, where bucketing is addressed, suggests that
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such a case, the broker who receives the order, in effect takes the
other side of that order through the use of a confederate.
The following hypothetical is an example of this type of bucket-
ing. Assume that an independent floor broker receives a cus-
tomer's market order to sell ten Frozen Pork Belly futures
contracts 20 at the prevailing market price. When the order
reaches the floor broker, pork belly futures contracts are trading at
43.15 cents per pound. Therefore, if all ten contracts were sold at
this index, the customer would receive $172,600. However, the
floor broker waits as the price falls to 41.80 cents per pound, or
$167,200. When he feels that the price is rising again, the floor
broker sells the contracts to a confederate for 42.25, predicting that
the prices will rise even higher. When the index once again reaches
43.15 cents per pound, the confederate sells the ten contracts to
another floor broker or trader. The confederate bought the ten
contracts for $169,000 and sold them for $172,600, thereby pocket-
ing a profit of $3,600. The floor broker then sends a confirmation
to the customer indicating that the customer's ten Pork Belly Fu-
tures contracts were sold at 42.25. It is virtually impossible for the
customer to detect any fraud because the markets move so rapidly.
The following is an example of bucketing losses into a cus-
tomer's account. Assume Customer A places an order to purchase
ten S&P 500 stock index futures contracts when they are trading at
the prevailing index of 350.10. In a volatile market, the index
could rise to 350.30 by the time the floor broker receives the order,
drop within a short time to 349.65, and rise again to 350.30. If the
floor broker is unable to fill the order when the index rises above
350.10, he is still liable to give the trade to the customer at that
price. To avoid losing money on the transaction, the floor broker
may ask a confederate to sell him a similar contract at 350.10, or
.10 points below the prevailing index. The confederate will then
get out of the position by buying at the then-current index of
350.35, incurring a loss of $125 on each contract. Rather than in-
cur the loss of $1,125.00 personally, the floor broker will bucket
the loss into Customer B's account. For example, to repay the
confederate, the floor broker may take Customer B's order for five
S&P 500 futures contracts and complete the trade with the confed-
Congress did not equate the two practices." I P. JOHNSON & T. HAZEN, supra note 45, at
§ 2.29.
120. The CME's Frozen Pork Belly futures contract is based on 40,000 pounds of
USDA-inspected 12-14 or 14-16 pound pork bellies. The contract is valued at the pre-
vailing rate of (market) cents per pound and the minimum price fluctuation is .025, or
$10.00. See generally Rules of the CME, supra note 86, at ch. 14.
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erate at a price determined through their collusion. This price
would be lower than the market price at that time, so the confeder-
ate could recoup his loss from Customer A's transaction.
IV. POSITIVE ASPECTS OF DUAL TRADING
In light of the inordinate amount of criticism that has been made
of dual trading, there is surprisingly little commentary or statistical
data supporting its positive aspects. It appears that the only mean-
ingful discussion on the subject, at least prior to the recent investi-
gation, is contained in a study published by the CME in 1976121
(the "CME Study") and in testimony of a CBT representative
before the CFTC on March 15, 1976 (the "CBT Testimony"). 122
Both the CME Study and the CBT Testimony were prepared in
response to the Commission's proposed rule-making regarding the
practice of dual trading. Notwithstanding the lack of information,
however, it is possible to state in general terms the following posi-
tive aspects of dual trading. First, dual trading increases market
liquidity and trading volume by expanding the number of, and ac-
tivity associated with, market participants. Second, dual trading
creates an incentive for floor brokers to act as "market makers"
during periods of volatility; thus, dual trading enables floor brokers
to serve as "shock absorbers" for the markets. Third, dual trading
increases transaction cost efficiency by reducing the bid/ask spread
on contracts. Fourth, it promotes expertise among floor brokers
who also execute orders for customer's accounts. Finally, permit-
ting dual trading arguably increases or at least helps maintain the
competitive market share of U.S. commodity futures exchanges be-
cause it serves to create more active markets.
With respect to the first aspect, liquidity and trading volume, the
CME Study concluded that:
Liquidity can be assumed to flow from two sectors: (1) market
makers or speculators operating in the pit; and (2) hedgers and
speculators operating outside the pits and away from the Ex-
change floor ... the former specifically functions as an offset to
intertemporal imbalances between buy and sell orders reaching
the floor of the Exchange .... ,,123
The CME Study provides statistical support for the proposition
121. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, An Inquiry Into the Benefits Of Dual Trading
On Organized Futures Markets, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Mar. 8, 1976 [hereinafter
CME Study].
122. Statement of Warren W. Lebeck On Behalf of the Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago Before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Mar. 15, 1976).
123. CME Study, supra note 121, at 3.
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that dual traders have historically predominated on a percentage
basis, over non-dual trading brokers handling only customer ac-
counts, as well as brokers trading solely for their own accounts.'24
Therefore, a potential consequence of eliminating the practice of
dual trading might be to seriously diminish liquidity in the various
contract markets. The most recent analysis of the importance of
dual trading to market liquidity can be found in the responses by
the commodity futures exchanges to a March 8, 1989, request by
the CFTC.'2 5 The responses indicate that, on average, 126 the per-
centage of volume attributable to dual traders in each exchange's
most active contract is approximately 48.2%.127
A second benefit of dual trading is that it provides an opportu-
nity for floor brokers to become "market makers" who act as
"shock absorbers" during periods of extreme volatility. When the
demand for brokerage services is low, floor brokers who engage in
dual trading, in this instance for their own account, can provide
liquidity or market making services. The increased liquidity pro-
vided by the market making activities of floor brokers serves to
reduce the bid/ask spread on contracts and results in higher prices
for sellers and lower prices for buyers. In less active commodity
futures markets, such as soybean meal, soybean oil, coffee, and co-
coa, there may not be enough order volume to allow hedgers 121 to
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. See CBT Report, supra note 6.
126. This average is weighted and is based on the average daily trading volume in
each exchange's most active contract.
127. CBT Report, supra note 6, at Appendix B. For example, dual trading accounted
for 45.4% of the total average daily volume in the CBT's U.S. Treasury Bond pit; 50.6%
of the total average daily volume in the CME's Eurodollar pit; 76% of the total average
daily volume in the CSCE's sugar 11 pit; 61.8% of the total average daily volume in
COMEX's gold futures pit; 36% of the total average daily volume in the KCBT's wheat
futures pit; 36-40% of the total average daily volume in the MGE's spring wheat futures
pit; 80% of the total average daily volume in the NYCE's cotton futures pit; 36% of the
total average daily volume in the NYFE's NYSE Composite Index futures pit; and 35%
of the total average daily volume of NYMEX's crude oil futures pit. Pierog & Stawick,
CFTC Gets Dual Trading Stats, Defenses, FUTURES, July, 1989, at 52.
128. Although the rules promulgated under the Act do not contain a definition of the
term "hedger," they define "bona fide hedging transactions or positions" as
transactions or positions in a contract for future delivery on any contract mar-
ket, or in a commodity option, where such transactions or positions normally
represent a substitute for transactions to be made or to be taken at a later time
in a physical marketing channel, and where they are economically appropriate
to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management of a commercial enter-
prise, and where they arise from: (i) The potential change in the value of assets,
which a person owns, produces, manufactures, processes, or merchandises or
anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing, processing, or merchandising,
(ii) The potential change in the value of liabilities which a person owes or antici-
Dual Trading
find matching orders. Proponents of free markets argue that the
local speculators, 29 who populate the pits at the two Chicago ex-
changes, enhance liquidity in those contract markets by betting on
future price directions and taking the risk from institutional inves-
tors as well as from the producers and users of the commodities
themselves. The loss of certain contract markets could hurt inves-
tors and, particularly, corporations that have come to rely on fi-
nancial futures contracts to protect against financial risk.1 30 This
particular beneficial aspect of dual trading is discussed at length in
a report from the CBT.'3
A third positive aspect of dual trading is that it reduces the bid/
ask spread on any given contract because dual traders in the pits
can intersperse their personal trades when wide spreads would
otherwise result in a high transaction cost to market partici-
pants. 132 The presence of dual traders in the pits effects a reduction
of spread differential, which passes transaction cost savings to cus-
tomers. The CME Study, which documented the increase in trans-
action cost efficiency, also correctly noted that it would be
manifestly unfair to impose additional transaction costs on market
participants solely on the basis of alleged, indeed, undocumented
abuses. 33 Such action could also have a deleterious effect on the
competitive position of U.S. commodity futures exchanges.
A fourth benefit of dual trading is the development of trader
expertise. Many proprietary traders, who are largely responsible
for providing added volume and liquidity to the markets, began as
dual traders. It has been argued that, absent such initial experience
as dual traders, many of these persons would not have developed
the expertise necessary to trade a proprietary account. Therefore,
market liquidity and trading volume would be adversely affected
by their absence from the pits. 34
According to the CME Study, dual trading by FCMs promotes
market efficiency by effectively utilizing the administrative, organi-
pates incurring, or (iii) The potential change in the value of services which a
person provides, purchases or anticipates providing or purchasing.
17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (1989).
129. Although the Act does not define the term "speculator," a person involved in
transactions and positions and whose purpose is not to offset price risks incidental to
commercial cash or spot operations, will most likely be considered a speculator for pur-
poses of section 4(a) of the Act. 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z)(1) (1989).
130. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 22, 1989, § 7, at 1, col. 5.
131. See CBT Report, supra note 6, at 33-34.
132. CME Study, supra note 121, at 7.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8-9.
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zational and developmental skills of traders. 3 5 The traditional ar-
gument advanced is that principals of FCMs who also have their
own money in the markets are more likely to have their attention
focused on these markets. Similarly, because floor brokers also
trade for their own account, they have an obvious incentive to
learn how the markets function and how to track market direc-
tions. The development of this type of expertise, certainly en-
hanced by the floor broker's own profit motive, is therefore
available for the benefit of public customers as well.
A fifth benefit of dual trading is that it allows U.S. exchanges to
maintain their market share at a time when globalized trading has
eroded their preeminent position vis-A-vis their foreign counter-
parts.'36 Commodity futures exchanges in the United States will
likely continue to lose their market share as financial risk manage-
ment and futures trading catches on in other parts of the world.'37
If Congress imposes a complete or even partial ban on dual trading
practices, the volume and liquidity currently provided by the U.S.
commodity futures exchanges may dissipate, resulting in higher
transactions costs that will accelerate the trend toward foreign fu-
tures trading.
The positive aspects of dual trading are well documented by the
CME Study and the CBT Testimony. Dual trading provides the
necessary elements for successful risk management by creating
deeper, more liquid markets, by providing an incentive for floor
135. Id. at 5.
136. Together, the CBT and the CME have garnered about 60% of global futures
and options trading. Financial Times, Mar. 8, 1989, § 3, at 1-2. Foreign exchanges,
however, are challenging traditional U.S. dominance in financial futures such as interest
rate and foreign currency futures. While the CBT's volume nearly doubled in the last
four years, its global marketshare fell four points to 33%. Future Shock is Rattling the
Futures Pits, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 1989, at 93-94.
137. The following futures and options exchanges have already been established
outside of the United States: in Europe, Amsterdam's European Options Exchange
(EOE), the Baltic Futures Exchange (BFE), the German Futures and Options Exchange
(Deutsche TerminBoerse or DBT), the Guarantee Fund for Danish Options and Futures,
the Irish Futures and Options Exchange, the London International Financial Futures
Exchange (LIFFE), the London Metal Exchange (LME), the London Potato Futures
Exchange (LPFE), the Marche a Terme d'Instruments Financiers (Matif), the Rotter-
dam Energy Futures Exchange (ROEFEX), the Stockholm Options Market (OM Swe-
den), Sweden's Options and Futures Exchange (SOFE) (now defunct) and the Swiss
Options and Futures Exchange (SOFFEX); in Canada, the Montreal Exchange, the To-
ronto Futures Exchange (TFE), Trans Canada Options of Toronto (TCO), and the Win-
nipeg Commodity Exchange (WCE); in South America, the Bolsa Mercantil y De
Futuros in Sao Paulo, Brazil; and in the Pacific Rim, the Hong Kong Futures Exchange
(HKFE), the New Zealand Futures Exchange (NZFE), the Osaka Futures Exchange
(OSE), the Singapore International Money Exchange (SIMEX), the Sydney Futures Ex-
change (SFE), and the Tokyo Financial Futures Exchange.
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brokers to act as market makers, and by reducing transaction costs
for market participants. It also fosters trader expertise, which
helps make U.S. markets more competitive in the international
arena. The fundamental purposes fulfilled by permitting the prac-
tice of dual trading clearly outweigh the negative aspects that
sometimes accompany it. Therefore, Congress should enact legis-
lation that will reduce or eliminate these negative aspects, without
entirely eliminating the practice of dual trading.
V. SURVEILLANCE METHODS, DISCIPLINARY AND
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, AND PENALTY PROVISIONS
Having now examined both the negative and positive aspects of
dual trading, it is appropriate at this point to look at the empirical
evidence. Specifically, this section of the Article will analyze the
surveillance systems employed by the two Chicago exchanges, the
record of disciplinary and enforcement actions taken by the ex-
changes and the CFTC, and the effectiveness of the penalty provi-
sions provided under the Act and by the various exchange rules.
A. The Government Accounting Office Report
On March 13, 1989, the United States Government Accounting
Office (the "GAO") issued a report (the "GAO Report")' 38 to the
Senate Agriculture Committee in which it severely criticized the
number and nature of disciplinary actions taken by the two Chi-
cago exchanges from 1984 through 1988. The GAO Report identi-
fied three factors that it used to determine "the intensity of CFTC
and exchange efforts to detect and punish trade practice abusers
"139
First, GAO examined the surveillance systems employed by the
CFTC and the two Chicago exchanges.' 4° It found that both the
CBT and the CME identify and investigate trade practice abuses
by similar means, through a Computerized Trade Reconstruction
System (the "CTR System").' 41 It also noted that the CFTC has
an oversight program that includes rule enforcement reviews of ex-
change actions and review of data from exchange audit trails. 142
The GAO Report further noted that the CFTC, through its over-
sight program, has concluded that the CME has a more effective
138. GAO Report, supra note 77.
139. Id. ch. 1, at 2.
140. Id. ch. 2, at 16-32.
141. Id. ch. 2, at 17. For a further discussion of the CTR system, see supra note 102.
142. GAO Report, supra note 77, ch. 1, at 23.
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CTR System and trade practice surveillance system than the
CBT. 43 GAO stated that the institution of the one-minute audit
trail time standard has increased the framework of controls at the
CFTC and the exchanges, but "[b]ecause the systems are new, the
process for improving them is evolving.""' In fact, the exchanges
have been unable to meet the one-minute standard; consequently,
they are only required to bracket their trades within thirty-minute
intervals.
Second, the GAO Report examined the number and nature of
disciplinary and enforcement actions taken by the CFTC and the
exchanges. 4 Specifically, GAO gathered information on ex-
change disciplinary actions such as fines, suspensions, and expul-
sions, as well as CFTC enforcement actions. Regarding exchange
disciplinary actions in general, from 1984 to 1988, the number of
such actions increased significantly at the CME 46 but remained
almost stationary at the CBT. 4 7 With respect to fines, GAO found
that the CME fined members significantly more than the CBT
fined its members during this same period. 148 Generally speaking,
the number of permanent expulsions at both exchanges was rela-
tively equal, while the number of suspensions1 49 varied widely. Fi-
nally, GAO found that from 1986 through February 13, 1989, the
CFTC assessed over $1.4 million in penalties, issued forty-five
cease and desist orders, forty-nine trading suspensions, and thirty-
two registration suspensions. 50
Third, GAO examined the effectiveness with which oversight re-
sults are used by the CFTC to detect patterns of violations and
other abuses of trade practice rules.'' The GAO made a limited
finding that trade information and disciplinary action information
"is not routinely aggregated for management's use."'5 2 As recently
as March 9, 1989, the CFTC criticized the CBT's computerized
143. Id. ch. 1, at 24-25.
144. Id. ch. 1, at 31.
145. Id. ch. 2, at 33-37.
146. Id. ch. 1, at 34. During this period, the number of CME floor participants sanc-
tioned for violations rose from 13 in 1984 to 105 in 1988. Id.
147. Id. During the same time period, the number of sanctions at the CBT was eight
in 1985, thirty-two in 1986, and only thirteen in 1988. Id.
148. Id. From 1984 to 1988, the CME fined its members a total of $3.6 million, while
CBT fines for the same period totalled only $812,000. Id.
149. Id. Suspensions at the CME increased from 238 days in 1986 to 12,392 days in
1987. Id. At the CBT, there were only 55 days of suspensions in 1984 and only 5,587 in
1986. Id.
150. Id. ch. 1, at 35.
151. Id. ch. 4, at 38.
152. Id.
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tracking system for failing to generate more disciplinary cases. 153
In an interview after a Senate Agriculture Committee hearing that
raised questions about the CFTC's performance in monitoring
trading practices, Andrea Corcoran, Director of the Division of
Trading and Markets of the CFTC, stated that the CBT's system
"has been used, if at all, very infrequently" as a basis for investigat-
ing questionable trades by CBT members.' 54 At the same hearing,
CFTC Chairman Wendy L. Gramm disclosed that the CBT has
initiated only sixteen of sixty-eight total investigations into trading
abuses over the last three years, on the basis of information gener-
ated by its own enforcement staff.15 This, along with evidence of a
better tracking record at the CME, would seem to indicate that the
problem lies not so much in the technological tracking capabilities
of the various exchanges but in the apparent inability of small,
poorly financed enforcement staffs to monitor available
information.
Because the GAO Report did not address the various resources
available to the CFTC and the exchanges, any meaningful analysis
of the enforcement process must take into consideration the finan-
cial and man-power commitment of these organizations. The en-
forcement budget for the CME in 1988 was $7.8 million, and the
CBT's budget was less than half, or approximately $3.6 million. 5 6
In contrast, in 1988, the New York Stock Exchange (the
"NYSE"), spent $68.6 million on surveillance measures and en-
forcement actions. 157
Furthermore, although the CME and the CBT have roughly
equivalently sized enforcement staffs, 158 the CME initiated a
greater percentage of investigations into trading abuses than did
the CBT. 59 Arguably, the vast disparity in the enforcement budg-
ets of the two Chicago exchanges explains the difference in their
enforcement records. It is possible to generalize from this disparity
that the enforcement problem is caused by inadequate financial re-
sources and enforcement staff, rather than an inherent inability or
unwillingness on the part of the exchanges to perform their statu-
153. Drew, CBOT Draws Fire As A Tracker, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 10, 1989, § 3, at
1, col. 4.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2, col. 2.
156. Id. at 1, col. 6.
157. Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1989, at C-13 (The NYSE has also reported that it main-
tains a regulatory staff consisting of approximately 544 persons).
158. Drew, supra note 153, at 2, col. 2. The CME has an eighty-nine member enforce-
ment division and the CBT has an eighty-three member enforcement staff. Id.
159. Id.
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torily-imposed duty to detect and punish alleged abuses. The Final
CFTC Staff Report on the Stock Index Futures and Cash Market
Activity-October 1987160 supports this explanation with its con-
clusion that:
The trade practice surveillance systems in place at the Commis-
sion have the demonstrated capacity to review large amounts of
trading data on an expedited schedule .... This trade practice
surveillance activity did not identify any pattern of futures or op-
tions on futures trading which indicates violative activity.' 6'
Although not addressed by the GAO Report, any meaningful
discussion regarding the adequacy of the existing system for de-
tecting and preventing dual trading abuses must also take into con-
sideration the penalty provisions provided by the CFTC and the
exchanges. Indeed, one of the underlying purposes of any punitory
system is to establish a deterrent effect. The CFTC and the ex-
changes, pursuant to the Act and their various internal rules and
bylaws, respectively, already possess the ability to impose severe
penalties for violations of the trade practice rules. The antifraud
provision of the Act, section 6b, 162 prohibits any member of a con-
tract market or other person, in or in connection with any order to
make, or in connection with the making of any contract of sale of
any commodity in interstate commerce, from cheating or de-
frauding or attempting to cheat or defraud any person; 63 from
willfully making any false report, statement, or record;' from
willfully deceiving or attempting to deceive another person respect-
ing any contract; 65 from willfully or knowingly bucketing any or-
der or filling any order by offset against the order(s) of any other
person; 66 or from taking the other side of any customer's order
without his prior consent. 16 7
Section 9168 of the Act provides several remedies for violations of
section 6b. First, section 9 provides that the Commission may in-
stitute an administrative action against any person for violations of
any provisions of the Act or the rules, regulations and orders
promulgated thereunder. 69 Second, the Commission may prohibit
160. Comm. Fut. L. R. (CCH) No. 321, Special Report, Feb. 5, 1988, at 176.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
163. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1988).
164. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(B) (1988).
165. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(C) (1988).
166. 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D) (1988).
167. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
168. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1988).
169. Id.
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such persons from trading for such period as may be specified by
order, suspend such person for a period not to exceed six months,
or revoke the registration of such person.' 7 ° Third, the Commis-
sion may assess against such person a civil money penalty of not
more than $100,000 for each violation.' 7 ' Finally, the Commission
may bring an action in an United States district court to enjoin any
person who has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage in any
act or practice constituting a violation of the Act, any rule, regula-
tion, or order thereunder, or who is restraining trading in any com-
modity for future delivery. 17 2
Although the CFTC is the commodity futures industry's pri-
mary regulator, the various contract markets have been given the
power to police themselves as self-regulatory organizations. 173 The
exchanges have therefore adopted rules that define various major
and minor offenses and that impose certain penalties for violations
of such rules. For example, the CBT has adopted Rule 560.00,174
which permits its Board of Directors, upon a vote of the majority
of Board members present, to suspend any person for a period of
time to be determined by the Board. Rule 560.00 further provides
that a person may be expelled from membership or a suspended
person may be deemed ineligible for reinstatement upon the vote of
two-thirds of the Board members present.' 75 Finally, Rule 560.00
also provides that the Board, upon majority vote of the members
present, may impose a fine of up to $75,000 upon any member or
member firm for each rule or regulation violated. 76
Similarly, the CME has adopted Rule 430,'77 which provides for
the classification of major offenses and minor offenses. Major of-
fenses are punishable by expulsion, suspension and/or a fine of not
more than $250,000, plus the monetary value of any benefit re-
ceived as a result of such offense. 17 A minor offense is punishable
by a fine of not more than $25,000 plus the monetary value of any
benefit received as a result of such offense.'7 9 In addition, a second
violation of such minor offense within a twenty-four month period
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1988).
173. See supra note 14 (definition of self regulatory organization).
174. Rule 560.00, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 518.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also. infra note 192 and accompanying text (proposed increase in the
amount of this fine).
177. Rule 430, Rules of the CME, supra note 86, ch. 4, at 23-24.
178. Id. at 23.
179. Id. at 23-24.
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will result in the imposition of a penalty reserved for major of-
fenses.'80 The CME has also adopted Rule 440,181 which provides
for the indemnification of the exchange by any member for the full
amount of any judgments or settlements paid by the CME with
respect to any legal proceeding brought against the exchange as a
result of an alleged violation by such member or the failure of the
CME to detect or prevent such violation.
The CFTC and the exchanges have provided appropriately strin-
gent penalties for violations of the Act and CFTC or exchange
rules. The power to suspend, expel and/or impose large monetary
fines on members who violate the rules, the Commission's injunc-
tive power, and the power to demand indemnification at the CME,
should surely serve to deter most exchange members from engag-
ing in violative activities. Nevertheless, the penalty provisions im-
posed by the two Chicago exchanges are inconsistent and should be
harmonized. Recommendations for Congressional action regard-
ing this subject will be considered below. 8 2
B. The Exchange Reports
On March 8, 1989, the CFTC requested that the exchanges be-
gin compiling data on the effects of dual trading in the commodity
futures markets.' 8 3 Specifically, the exchanges were asked to select
a period of at least one week in late 1988 to study dual trading by
brokers in the following three categories: each exchange's most ac-
tive contract, a moderately active contract and a less active con-
tract. Each exchange was asked to identify all dual traders who
deal in those three contracts and to note the volume attributable to
their activity.8 4 The reports, which were submitted to the CFTC
on April 30, 1989, will be discussed hereafter.
Surprisingly, the two reports suggest a significant dichotomy in
180. Id. at 24.
181. Id. at 27.
182. See infra Part VI.
183. The CFTC's directive is apparently the result of a request from the Senate Agri-
culture Committee that the Commission respond to a series of proposals to strengthen
enforcement mechanisms, including imposing various restrictions on dual trading in any
pits when the audit trail cannot meet a ninety percent accuracy rate and when liquidity is
adequate. Letter to Mr. William J. Brodsky, President of the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director of the Division of Trading and Markets,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Mar. 8, 1989). See also McMurray, Futures
Exchanges Told To Compile Dual Trading Data, Wall. St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at C-13, col.
1.
184. Probe Into Dual Trading, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Mar. 10, 1989, at 84; see also,
CFTC To Continue Dual Trade Studies, W. LIVESTOCK J., Mar. 13, 1989, at 5.
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the approach to be taken by Congress during the 1989 CFTC
reauthorization proceedings. The CME Report tentatively pro-
posed a partial ban on the practice of dual trading, while the CBT
Report argued against such a ban, focusing instead on the need for
improved transaction time sequence reconstruction capabilities and
enhanced compliance procedures and penalties for violators. The
remainder of this Article will therefore review the pertinent recom-
mendations made by the two Chicago exchanges, highlight the dif-
ferences between them, and conclude with a review of specific
proposals for congressional action during the 1989 CFTC
reauthorization proceedings.
1. The CBT Report
The CBT Report'85 generally reviewed the principal benefits of
broker trading' 86 and recommended that no prohibition, either
partial or total, be imposed on dual trading.' 87 The CBT's position
is that "[t]he only reasonable approach to any problem of customer
abuse involves enhancement of detection capabilities and imposi-
tion of appropriately large penalties for those found committing an
abuse."'18 8  The CBT Report, therefore, reviewed the CTR Plus
surveillance system and cited the Brady Report's conclusion that
the audit trail systems of the U.S. commodity futures markets are
superior to those found in other financial markets. ' 89 Nevertheless,
the CBT Report also acknowledged that improvements are needed
and reported that the exchanges intend to spend approximately $1
million on enhancing their system further. 190 Moreover, the CBT
185. CBT Report, supra, note 6.
186. According to the CBT, the term "broker trading" is more descriptive than the
term dual trading. "Broker trading is practiced by any individual or firm that functions in
a fiduciary relationship for a client as an agent or advisor and trades as principal for its
own benefit as well." Id. at 4 n.2, 9.
187. Id. at 21. According to the CBT Report:
In general, broker trading provides benefits for futures market participants in
three ways. First, broker trading enhances futures market performance by in-
creasing market liquidity, yielding tighter bid/ask spreads and increased market
depth.... Second, customers of broker traders benefit through better execution
prices that are available through unique trading techniques and the increased
trading flexibility that the ability to broker trade[s] gives a broker. Finally, bro-
ker trading benefits all potential futures market brokerage customers by main-
taining a residual supply of brokerage services to meet a volatile changing
demand.
Id.
188. Id. at 46.
189. Id. at 39-40. See Brady Report of the Presidential Task Force on Market Mecha-
nisms, Jan. 1988, at 67.
190. CBT Report, supra note 6, at 40.
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Report listed nine trade practice resolutions, designed to further
increase the capabilities of the CTR and the CTR Plus systems in
detecting trade practice abuses.' 9' Finally, the CBT Report also
stated that a $250,000 penalty has been proposed to replace the
current $75,000 penalty presently levied against members who vio-
late the rules. 192
2. The CME Report
In contrast to the CBT Report, the CME Report'93 on trading
practices tentatively recommended a partial' 94 ban on dual trading
in all contract months that have reached a level of "mature liquid-
ity," 95 as determined by the CME Board of Governors, taking into
consideration market conditions and the advice of the CME Re-
search Department, industry experts, and market participants. 96
However, three categories of persons would be exempt from this
ban: (1) floor brokers who receive specific written permission from
the ultimate customer on an annual basis; (2) floor brokers who
predominantly conduct spread business on a continuous basis be-
tween "mature liquidity" months and "non-mature liquidity"
months as determined by the compliance staff of the CME; 19 7 and
(3) floor brokers executing orders for other members. 98
The CME Report also recommended that a member who begins
the trading session by filling orders in a "mature liquidity" month
be prohibited from trading directly or indirectly on that same day
for his personal account, in any month of the market within which
191. Id. The various proposals are discussed below. See infra notes 219-28 and ac-
companying text.
192. Id. at 37-38 n.8.
193. Report of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Special Committee to Review Trad-
ing Practices to the Board of Governors (Apr. 19, 1989) [hereinafter CME Report].
194. The CME Report states that "under present market conditions, the recom-
mended dual trading ban would affect approximately 80 percent of all transactions on the
CME." Id. at 9.
195. A "mature liquidity" designation would be given to every contract month of
every contract that "has reached a level of maturity, transaction volume, and consistency
of bids and offers that is sufficient to maintain an efficient and viable market without dual
trading." Id.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 9. According to the CME Report, "[i]f spread brokers were prohibited
from taking an opposite position in a liquid month because of a ban on dual trading, they
would not trade in the non-liquid month, thereby reducing liquidity in those contract
months where it is most needed." Id.
198. Id. The CME Report asserts that this type of dual trading should be exempted
because public customer order execution is unaffected by such activity and because mem-
bers of an exchange are better able to monitor their own trade executions by other mem-
bers. Id.
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the order was filled. The latter prohibition, however, would not
affect a member who begins the trading session trading solely for
his own account, unless he thereafter registers to become a trader
in a "mature liquidity" month. At such time, the prohibition shall
apply to him, whether trading directly or indirectly for his own
account. 199
VI. REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
200
The findings in the GAO Report, and a review of the penalty
provisions provided by the Act and exchange rules, demonstrate
199. CME Report, supra note 193, at 7.
200. Congress is already considering the "Commodity Futures Improvements Act of
1989," a bipartisan bill that would ban the practice of dual trading in any futures contract
having an average daily trading volume of 7,000 contracts or more. H.R. 2869, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REC. H5603-30 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1989) [hereinafter H.R.
2869]. Depending upon price volatility, widening of bid/ask spreads, and other market
disruptions, this threshold level of trading volume may be adjusted by the CFTC, upon
its giving notice within three days of such action to the Committee on Agriculture of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry of
the Senate. Id. at 5605.
The bill provides for certain limited exceptions to this ban, namely, for spread trades
for a floor broker's own account, and for proprietary trading at the opening of the market
in order to settle trading errors from the previous day. Id. at 5615. In addition, the bill
recognizes an exception for floor brokers who receive specific annual written permission
from their public customers to engage in dual trading. The bill would also allow the
CFTC to issue an exemptive order to any commodity futures exchange that can
demonstrate that its audit trail can detect any and all instances of trading violations
attributable to dual trading and that such detection capabilities are fully verifiable. Id.
Within one year from the effective date of the bill, H.R. 2869 would also require the
exchanges to be able to verify to the minute, the time of execution of any transaction. Id.
Moreover, within three years from the effective date of the bill, the exchanges would be
required to pinpoint the time of execution of any transaction to within thirty seconds. Id.
In addition, H.R. 2869 would make it unlawful for any member of a broker association
to execute a customer order with another member of such association, either for the
personal account of the other member, or for the account of the association. Id. The bill
would also limit the percentage of trading activity among members of such associations
to twenty-five percent of each member's total monthly transactions, irrespective of the
underlying account being traded. Id. This practice has already been instituted at the
CME.
Finally, the proposed bill would make it unlawful for any person to act as a floor trader
unless such person has registered under the Act, with the CFTC, and such registration
has not expired, been suspended or revoked. Id. at 5616. This provision of the bill is
apparently designed to subject floor traders to the same disqualification criteria as floor
brokers who trade for customer accounts.
The Senate is considering a bill that would allow the CFTC to issue deficiency lettters
and suspend dual trading until such time as an exchange can comply with certain
stringent surveillance criteria.
The Congress is also considering two other bills, H.R. 603 and H.R. 606, that would
ban dual trading in financial futures. The bills, one of which was first introduced in 1987,
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
that reform is needed in order to prevent further abuses of the
practice of dual trading. Unfortunately, however, the reports of
the two exchanges suggest a significant dichotomy in the course of
action to be taken by the Congress during the 1989 CFTC
reauthorization process with respect to reforming the practice of
dual trading. This dichotomy between the two industry leaders
will undoubtedly strengthen the arguments of those persons who
seek to impose a ban on the practice of dual trading.
It is this writer's opinion that any proposal to ban dual trading,
either partially or completely, is ill-conceived and premature at
the present time. The CME's Special Committee to Review Trad-
ing Practices stated in the CME Report that dual trading has been
defended by the CME in the past on the basis that it is a common
practice at most futures exchanges, that it is a critical element in
insuring market depth and liquidity, and that exchange surveil-
lance programs are adequate to detect and prevent trade practice
were reintroduced by Rep. Neal Smith (D-Iowa). H.R. 603 & 606, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.,
135 CONG. REC. H93 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1989) [hereinafter H.R. 603 & H.R. 606].
House Bill 606 is limited to futures contracts based on securities or stock indexes and
proposes to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act"), rather than the
Commodity Exchange Act. It would insert a new subsection to section 10 of the 1934
Act as follows:
No trader, who trades for their own account or any account in which such
trader has trading discretion and also executes orders for any other person or
persons, shall own, control or have a beneficial interest in, or enter into any
contract or contract for future delivery in any financial instrument, stock index,
or any contract for future delivery based in any way on securities or equity
securities on any contract market.
H.R. 606, 101st Congress, 1st Sess. (1989). The bill was purposefully drafted this way in
order to bring it in front of the House Energy and Commerce Committee rather than the
House Agriculture Committee. The Energy and Commerce Committee has been more
supportive of a ban on dual trading than the Agriculture Committee, which traditionally
has jurisdiction over the commodity futures industry. Opponents of the bill have argued
that a ban on dual trading is clearly outside the Energy and Commerce Committee's
jurisdiction.
The second bill, House Bill 603, would amend section 8 of the Act by inserting a new
subsection as follows: "(d)(l) As used in this subsection "insider" means any individual
who has access to material information, not generally available to the public, about pres-
ent or anticipated cash or futures trading or present or anticipated cash or futures posi-
tions, to which such individual is not a party, in any commodity of any other persons,
where such trading or positions are in amounts at or above Commission designated re-
porting levels as specified pursuant to § 4i of this Act . . . (2) No insider shall, own,
control, have a beneficial interest in, or enter into any contract or contract for future
delivery in any such commodity on any contract market." H.R. 603, 101st Congress, 1st
Sess. (1989). Hence, H.R. 603 would effectively prohibit exchange officials from using
material non-public information about the futures markets to trade for their own ac-
counts. See Smith Proposes Dual Trading Ban Amid Calls For Market Reforms, SEC.
WK., Feb. 6, 1989, at 9; House Stuns Futures Industry By Referring Dual Trading Bill To
Dingell, SEC. WK., Feb. 16, 1987, at 1.
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abuses.2°' Nevertheless, the Special Committee went on to state
"[w]hile the foregoing is still valid, it has become painfully evident
that the public image of futures markets and their members has
been adversely impacted by the widely-held belief that dual trading
in futures leads to customer abuses. ' 20 2 Although this may cer-
tainly be true, a number of factors mitigate against the acceptabil-
ity of this premise as the basis for a recommendation to impose a
partial ban on dual trading.
First, there is some question as to whether it is in fact a widely
held belief that dual trading in futures leads to customer abuses.
Media reports of "widespread fraud" and "cheating of customers"
in the pits of the two Chicago exchanges have themselves been the
subject of much criticism by other media members.20 3 Moreover,
volume at the CME was record-breaking in the months following
the investigation.2° Second, a partial ban would be premature in
light of the fact that, as of the date of this publication, only forty-
six indictments have been issued.20 5 Moreover, industry insiders
now place the number of persons under investigation at as few as
one-hundred traders. 20 6  Finally, the CBT Report aptly demon-
strates the differences between those types of trade practice abuses
that are uniquely available to dual traders and those that are avail-
able to non-dual traders who trade solely for their own account.20 7
Such a distinction is critical because it highlights the futility of im-
posing a partial or complete ban on dual trading in order to eradi-
cate all of the alleged abuses currently under investigation. The
201. CME Report, supra note 193, at 7.
202. Id. at 8.
203. See Protess, Commodities Investigation-The Story Behind The Story, CHI. LAW.,
Mar. 1989, at 1; There's No Such Thing As A Free Leak, CHI. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 12;
Deutsch, Passing Sentence Before Trial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1989, § 3, at I.
204. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 4, 1989, § 3, at 1; CBOT, CME Fight For Self-Regulation
Edge in Automation, FUTURES, Apr. 1989, at 74.
205. Bailey & McMurray, Futures Shock.- Traders Are Indicted For Running The Pits
By Their Own Rules, Wall St. J., Aug. 3, 1989, at A-1, col 6.
206. Greb, Futures Trading.- No Need To Panic, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1989, § 1
at 17, col. 2. As one commentator has noted: "This is not a number to be treated
lightly .... [I]t represents a small percentage of Chicago's more than 7,400 futures trad-
ers, the 6,200-plus members of the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange and 1,200 on the secondary MidAmerica Commodity Exchange." Id. See also,
Lawyers See Hurdles For Futures Inquiry, New York Times, Feb. 20, 1989, § D at 2, col.
4 (placing the number of persons under investigation at about twenty to twenty-five peo-
ple); Futures Shock-Digging the Dirt in Chicago, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Feb. 24, 1989, at 1
(Weekend Special); FBI Probe May Be Smaller Than Originally Thought, DROVERS J.,
Mar. 2, 1989, at 2; You Can Almost Hear A Sigh Of Relief In The Pits, Bus. WK., Feb. 20,
1989, at 33.
207. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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difficulty presented by this dichotomy is that where the CME Re-
port was perhaps too responsive to public perception, the CBT Re-
port did not offer enough of an olive branch to the CFTC and
Congress.
The status of H.R. 2869 and the other legislation pending before
Congress is uncertain at the present time. Undoubtedly, various
floor amendments will be introduced to modify the current text of
those proposals. It would be impossible to predict with any degree
of accuracy which provisions will be included in the final version of
any legislation; hence, any attempt to analyze the various bills
would be somewhat unproductive at this time.28 Nevertheless,
this section of the article will set forth the various suggestions that
have been made (including some of those set forth in the various
bills) for reforming the practice of dual trading, and it will make
some conclusions on the reasonable alternatives that exist for fur-
ther regulating without banning the practice of dual trading.
There are several ways that Congress may effectively police dual
trading practices, thereby eliminating the need to impose a com-
plete ban on such activity. First, transaction time sequence recon-
struction capabilities could be improved. Second, compliance
measures could be further refined. Third, exchanges could elimi-
nate or uniformly restrict dual trading among members of broker
groups. 21 Fourth, the CFTC could permit block trading, which
could partially alleviate the alleged abuses currently under investi-
gation. Fifth, federal agents could be placed permanently on the
exchange floors in an effort to create a "worry factor" among floor
brokers. Sixth, the CFTC could require floor traders to register
with it before conducting proprietary trading in the pits. Seventh,
a partial ban rather than a total ban could be imposed on heavily
traded contracts when liquidity and volume concerns are less seri-
ous. Finally, Congress could impose a complete ban on dual
trading.
With respect to the first recommendation, one of the frequent
arguments made in support of permitting dual trading is that
abuses can be controlled if the contract markets have adequate
transaction time sequence reconstruction capabilities. As noted
above, this was a central goal of the 1974 Amendments to Regula-
tion sections 1.35(e),21 0 (g)(1), 21' and (h).2 12 Until 1986, the com-
208. For a discussion of the key provisions of the various bills, see supra note 200.
209. See infra note 234 and accompanying text (a discussion of broker groups).
210. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(e) (1989).
211. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(g)(1) (1989).
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modity futures exchanges were required under section 1.35(g)(1) to
record the thirty-minute period within which each trade was exe-
cuted. In an effort to enhance trade practice surveillance measures,
that section was amended to require each exchange to implement
timing and record-keeping systems that enable it to show the
mechanically or electronically verified time of execution of each
trade to at least the nearest minute.21 3
Unfortunately, however, most of the exchanges have been un-
able to meet the one-minute standard. 2 4 The exchanges' surveil-
lance systems currently use data input from sequentially numbered
trading cards and order tickets, including the entry time-stamps,
the manually recorded time of execution, and thirty-minute
bracket designations.21 5 Recently, the two Chicago exchanges have
tightened this latter requirement by requiring bracketing of trades
every fifteen minutes. 2 6 An even tougher standard has been intro-
duced in proposed H.R. 2869, which would require the exchanges
to verify, to within one minute, the time of execution of any trans-
action by one year from the effective date of the bill, and to within
thirty seconds by three years.
One of the problems inherent in the exchanges' trade reconstruc-
tion process is that it depends in part upon the input of data from
the floor participants themselves, who may intentionally or inad-
vertently make reporting errors. Nevertheless, a reduction in the
amount of time in which floor brokers and floor traders can report
trades may result in less of an opportunity to fabricate trading
data. Therefore, the requirement of one-minute bracketing of
trades, as set forth in H.R. 2869, may theoretically serve to en-
hance transaction time sequence reconstruction capabilities. A
second problem with the trade reconstruction process results from
the fact that, in active markets, hundreds of trades may take place
within a one-minute period. This fact creates additional support
for the requirement in H.R. 2869 that the exchanges be capable of
verifying to within thirty seconds, the time of execution of any
transaction, by three years of the effective date of the bill.21 7 Mar-
ket liquidity, however, may be severely diminished because open
outcry requires constant participation. If floor brokers and traders
212. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(h) (1989).
213. 17 C.F.R. § 1.35(g)(2) (1989).
214. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
215. Id.
216. See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
217. H.R. 2869, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 135 CONG. REC. H5603-30 (daily ed. Sept. 20,
1989).
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have to leave the pit every minute to turn in their trading cards,
there will be less of an opportunity to match orders.
Perhaps the strongest argument against a one-minute or thirty-
second bracketing requirement is that recordation by the floor bro-
ker or trader interferes with his ability to quickly execute orders in
active markets. Industry regulators, on the other hand, have ar-
gued that this type of requirement would affect floor participants
uniformly and any detriment resulting from a decrease in the speed
with which orders are executed will be offset by the benefit of in-
creased trade reconstruction capabilities. Moreover, regulators ar-
gue that the ability to pinpoint the time of execution of trades may
lead to an increased perception of market integrity at U.S. com-
modity futures exchanges. What they fail to understand, however,
is that such an onerous requirement would eliminate the reason for
the success of the domestic exchanges - open outcry. A more
reasonable approach would be to allow the exchanges a period of
time in which to develop new technologies that could accomplish
this purpose without adversely affecting market liquidity.
The most significant defect in H.R. 2869 is that the ability of
each exchange to permit dual trading is dependent upon its ability
to demonstrate that it can meet the one-minute bracketing require-
ment. The two Chicago exchanges have already adopted various
ruled designed to enhance their surveillance systems and have
agreed to cooperate in developing the AUDITs system.21 s There-
fore, rather than withdraw the dual trading ban after the ex-
changes can demonstrate their compliance with the bill's audit trail
goals, Congress should elect to allow dual trading to continue
while the exchanges develop such new technologies. If the ex-
changes are unable to verify their capabilities by the designated
times, then and only then should their members be subject to a ban
on dual trading.
Second, exchanges could further refine compliance measures.
Indeed, the CBT and the CME have already taken action in this
regard. 219 Recently, the CBT's Board of Directors unanimously ap-
proved the following nine actions designed to improve compliance
and surveillance systems. First, the CBT voted to change the
"standard" time bracket 220 increment to fifteen minutes from thirty
218. See supra note 99.
219. CBT Approves Plan To Improve Audit Surveillance, LIVESTOCK MKT. DIG.,
Mar. 20, 1989, at 5.
220. "Bracketing" of a trade is the identification of the trade as having been executed
during a specified time period during the trading day. [1975-1977 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,242, at 21,291 n.6.
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minutes.22" ' Second, the CBT has established a period of fewer than
fifteen minutes as the first 222 and last223 time bracket for all con-
tract's respective trading sessions. The exchange has also estab-
lished a system of accountability for members and clearing firms
for all sequentially numbered trading cards on a daily basis, 224 and
will require that member's trading cards be picked up by clearing
firms at one-hour intervals throughout the day and remitted to the
CBT's Clearing Corporation one hour after that.225 The CBT will
also require that all trading cards receive an exchange-designated
time-stamp as they are taken from the trading floor.226 Finally, the
CBT will establish an exchange floor "master clock" system, accu-
rate to the nearest second, by which all time-stamp machines on
the floor will be synchronized, 22' and it will install an "automatic
bell" on the trading floor to designate a change of time bracket.228
The CME has also taken initiatives in this area by implementing
the first order-routing system on its trading floor. The Trade Order
Processing System ("TOPS") 229 is an order entry and fill reporting
system that is designed to speed the flow of non-arbitraged paper
orders to the floor. 230 The goal of TOPS will be to enhance timely
order delivery and fill reporting and to reduce transcription errors.
TOPS will also improve the efficiency of the CME clearing system
and improve transaction time sequence reconstruction
capabilities. 3'
One area that has not yet been addressed, but which should be
further refined, is the exchanges' penalty provisions for violations
221. Rule 332.02, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 312. Currently, when filling in
trading cards, CBT traders and brokers are only required to mark down the time of
trades to within thirty minutes accuracy. Id.
222. Id. CBT traders and brokers will be required to be even more precise in record-
ing the time of trades shortly after the opening of trading and just before closing. This
change was prompted by reports that the early and final moments of trading in the pits
are more susceptible to cheating. Id.
223. Id.
224. Rules 332.04 and 332.05, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 312-13.
225. Rule 332.05, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 313 and note 101. At the
present time, CBT clearing firms only pick up trader's and broker's transaction cards
twice daily-at 10:30 a.m. and at the close of trading. Id.
226. Id. This change is designed to monitor the holders of trading cards at any given
time. Id.
227. Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, New Rule (undesignated).
228. Id. The new bell will ring every quarter-hour to remind traders that they have
entered a new time bracket. Id.
229. See supra note 97 (discussing TOPS).
230. Henderson, CME/CBT Add Controls As The Heat Rises, DROVERS J., Mar. 16,
1989, at 24.
231. Id.
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of trade reporting requirements. CBT Rule 519.01(b)(ii) 232 cur-
rently provides for a fine of up to $1,000 for a fourth offense involv-
ing either errors or omissions in reporting bracketing of trades, or
errors or omissions involving the submission of computerized trade
reconstruction data. Similarly, CME Rule 421233 provides that the
exchange's Computerized Trade Reconstruction Committee shall
have the responsibility for reviewing clearing members' and mem-
bers' compliance with CTR rules and shall have the authority to
fine up to $5,000 for noncompliance with such rules.
These rules should be refined to provide more stringent mone-
tary penalties for violations of trade reporting rules. The most rea-
sonable way to eliminate or reduce trade practice abuses is to make
the cost of such abuses prohibitive. By increasing monetary penal-
ties, the CFTC and exchanges will reduce reporting violations,
thereby improving transaction time sequence reconstruction capa-
bilities. Such improved capabilities may lead to detection of the
type of trading abuses that will trigger the penalties of up to
$250,000 and $75,000 previously mentioned. In essence, by man-
dating harsher penalties for violations of members' trade reporting
requirements, the Commission and the exchanges will close an ex-
isting loophole in the enforcement process.
Third, the exchanges could adopt rules designed to eliminate or
uniformly restrict the practice of dual trading among members of
broker groups.234 In the past, broker groups have been criticized
on the basis that they foster the opportunity to engage in illegal
activity, such as front-running and bucketing. One view is that
because broker groups share revenues and pool expenses, their
members have an incentive to assist each other in illegal schemes.
A contrary view is that broker groups provide a means for individ-
ual brokers to share the costs of trading mistakes, thereby reducing
the risks of trading as an individual. As with dual trading itself,
illegal activity is not inherent in the mere existence of broker
groups. Therefore, Congress should not prohibit the formation of
such associations; rather, it should acknowledge the valid purposes
232. Rule 519.01, Rules of the CBT, supra note 85, at 505-06.
233. Rule 421, Rules of the CME, supra note 86, ch. 4, at 23.
234. Broker groups are associations of individual floor brokers, usually members of
the same pit, who share revenues and pool their expenses. Although legally sanctioned
by the two Chicago exchanges, broker groups are required to register as such with the
exchanges, and, at the CME, their members are limited in the percentage of trades they
can execute with each other. Violating those limits can result in the imposition of a
$5,000 fine. The CBT, however, does not impose such a limitation. See generally Broker
Study By Exchange in Chicago, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, § D, at 5, col. 1.
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they serve and seek to subject such groups to more stringent penal-
ties for violations of intragroup trading limits. Moreover, all ex-
changes should be required to impose such intragroup trading
limits to create uniformity throughout the industry. By so doing,
those who engage in fraudulent activity will be appropriately pun-
ished and those who do not engage in such activity will be permit-
ted to continue their valuable membership in such associations.
Fourth, the CFTC could modify the current open outcry system
and permit block trading as the stock exchanges already do. Block
trading, also known as "sunshine trading," would permit members
of an exchange to preannounce large orders being sent to the mar-
ket at a particular time. Exchange members would submit advance
written notice of their intentions to trade a large block of futures or
options contracts to the exchange, which would then announce the
member's order. One potential concern with regard to permitting
block trading is the likelihood of confusion as to whether such ac-
tivity constitutes prearranged trading, in violation of the Act and
the regulations promulgated thereunder. Currently, prearranged
trading is prohibited by section 6b235 of the Act and Commission
Regulation section 155.2(f). 23 6 Therefore, any effort by the CFTC
to permit block trading must take into consideration the ability of
exchange enforcement staff to distinguish between permitted prear-
ranged trading in the form of block trades and unpermitted prear-
ranged trading. The CFTC should consider the possibility of
establishing a safe harbor for compliance with whatever block trad-
ing regulations are adopted. By so doing, exchange members will
be able to engage in block trading activities without fear of violat-
ing the Act or the regulations promulgated thereunder.
A second concern involves the rights of exchange members who,
because of limited financial resources, cannot participate in block
trading. Many local traders believe that they have the right to par-
ticipate in any trade that takes place on the exchange floor. Yet,
many floor traders will be unable to accommodate large block
trades. One compromise position that has been advanced is to al-
low floor traders to participate in block trading-if they can offer a
better price than the one previously agreed to by the larger
wirehouses. 237 Block trading could potentially reduce the abuses
associated with dual trading because large institutional investors
235. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1988).
236. 17 C.F.R. § 155.2(f) (1989).
237. FBI Probe Heightens New York Firms' Push To Accommodate Block Trades,
SEC. WK., Mar. 13, 1989, at 7-8.
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would be on both sides of the transaction and they would have
already agreed on the price and quantity terms. By engaging in
block trading, such investors could eliminate the risk of what
might happen in the pits by establishing full disclosure of the terms
of any given transaction prior to its execution. One potential dis-
advantage of this alternative, however, is that it will not protect
smaller market participants who cannot accommodate large
orders.238
Fifth, the CFTC and the exchanges could permanently plant
Federal agents in the pits in order to create a worry factor among
floor brokers and traders and deter further abuses. Indeed, this
suggestion has been made by Representative Glenn English (D.,
Okla.), the Chairman of the House subcommittee responsible for
examining futures trading regulations.239 Yet, this proposed alter-
native has several defects. One problem is that the cost of planting
Federal agents in the pits on an anonymous basis would be prohibi-
tive. Seats on the exchanges and other costs associated with main-
taining a permanent cover for Federal agents could run into the
millions of dollars. Indeed, the current investigation, which has
lasted two and a half years, is estimated to have cost taxpayers at
least $1 million.2 ° Another difficulty is that most of the alleged
fraud would go undetected insofar as many members will only
commit illegal acts with those persons whom they know and trust.
Consequently, undercover agents would merely be able to observe
instances of fraud and manipulation engaged in by others. Unfor-
tunately, the pits are too crowded and chaotic for agents to be an
effective deterrent for floor brokers and traders.
Sixth, the CFTC could require floor traders to register with it
before commencing proprietary trading in the pits. Currently, only
floor brokers who trade for public customers, as well as their own
accounts, must register with the CFTC. Requiring floor traders to
register with the CFTC would enable regulators to disapprove ap-
plications of prospective members with unsavory backgrounds;
therefore, this requirement should be adopted.
A seventh alternative would be for the CFTC to exercise its
238. Power, Futures Exchanges Urged To Allow Block Trading, Wall St. J., Mar. 3,
1989, at C-12, col. 4. For example, in the securities markets, large orders may only be
purchased and sold in minimum lots of 10,000 shares or more. Id.
239. Spear, Panel To Consider Using Federal Agents; Electronic Trading Unveiled By
CBT, Feedstuffs, Mar. 20, 1989, at 22, col. 1.
240. Baquet & Burton, Trader Probe Is Stingingly Sophisticated, Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 6, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
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power under section 6j241 of the Act to make separate determina-
tions for different contract markets and to take into account the
effect upon the liquidity of trading in each market. Thus, the
CFTC could decide to ban dual trading in any contract markets,
except those where dual trading is essential in order to provide
depth and liquidity for hedgers who need the market to function in
order to protect against risk. A similar suggestion has already
been incorporated into a draft of H.R. 2869.242 The problem with
this approach is that if FCMs and floor brokers, who cannot sur-
vive economically unless permitted to dual trade, switch contract
markets solely on the basis that dual trading is permitted in one
market and not in the other, market depth in the contract dually
traded may be artificially inflated.
Finally, another alternative would be to impose a complete ban
on dual trading even though, at this time, there is no empirical
evidence that widespread abuses result from the practice of dual
trading itself. The probable consequence of this alternative is that
some existing markets would be greatly hampered, if not elimi-
nated. In markets with low trading volumes, when there is no cus-
tomer order to take the opposite side of a trade, a ban on dual
trading would eliminate an active market for that particular con-
tract because a floor broker or FCM would be unable to trade for
his or its own account or one in which the floor broker or FCM has
an interest. The difficulty with this approach is that it represents a
drastic solution to a problem, the cause of which has not yet been
determined.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current investigation of the Chicago and New York ex-
changes has raised the question of whether dual trading should be
banned. Although critics point to the allegations of widespread
abuse associated with dual trading (i.e., front-running and bucket-
ing), at this time, there is little empirical evidence to substantiate a
causal relationship between them. While the rules regulating the
practice of dual trading are clearly in need of reform, there is also
little doubt that the practice is vitally important to the strength of
the United States commodity futures industry. Opponents of dual
241. Sections 6j(1) and (2) each provide "that nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit the Commission from making separate determinations for different contract
markets when such are warranted in the judgement of the Commission .... ." 7 U.S.C.
§ 6j(1)-(2) (1988).
242. See supra note 200.
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trading have failed to demonstrate a nexus between the alleged
abuses and the practice of dual trading itself. Therefore, the CFTC
and the exchanges should be given an opportunity to first study
and implement the recommended alternatives to either a partial or
complete ban on dual trading. Imposing any ban on dual trading is
clearly premature at this time, and Congress should not act in a
way that may eliminate certain markets merely because 1989 hap-
pens to be a reauthorization year.
